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There are great expectations for a resurgence in federal 
environmental enforcement in a Biden-led federal government. Indeed, 
federal environmental enforcement suffered serious blows during the Trump 
Administration, particularly at the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 
including large cuts in the budget for enforcement and reversals of key 
enforcement policies. Yet, while important to repair the damage, truly 
strengthening federal environmental enforcement will require more. This 
Article highlights the need for greater attention to the multiple hurdles that 
plague environmental enforcement. In doing so it makes three contributions 
to the literature. First, it asserts that even though environmental statutes, 
regulations, and guidance documents often contain “enforceable” as an 
explicit term, in practice the term lacks scope and definition, making the 
actual enforceability of regulations dubious. Second, it demonstrates the 
difficulties with actual enforceability by examining key hurdles that become 
legal defenses for corporate and government defendants in environmental 
enforcement matters regarding regulatory exceptions, evidentiary standards, 
and the preemption and preclusion doctrines. Third, it recommends that 
drafters of environmental laws and regulations consider actual 
enforceability by considering, within the documents they are drafting, the 
likely hurdles for enforcers after the law or regulation becomes effective. 
Although hurdles in environmental enforcement are important for regulatory 
flexibility, judicial expediency, and other normative values, they often result 
in a tradeoff for achieving enforceability of environmental laws and 
regulations. Grappling with such tradeoffs, within the law or regulation 
itself, is essential for meeting the expectations for enforcement held by 
regulated entities, researchers, environmental advocates, and most of all, 
local communities. After all, as noted in a March 2021 Grist news article, 
“laws are only as good as their enforcement.”2 
                                                 
1 Seema Kakade is an Associate Professor and Director of the Environmental Law Clinic 
at the University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law.  She formerly worked as 
an attorney for the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s Office of Compliance and 
Enforcement Assurance.  The author would like to thank Michael Sammartino for his 
invaluable student research assistance on this article. 
2 Naveena Sadasivam, Inside Biden’s Uphill Battle to Restore the EPA After Trump, 
THE GRIST (Mar. 1, 2021), https://grist.org/politics/epa-joe-biden-environmental-law-
enforcement-trump/. 
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The Biden Administration has put environmental justice and climate 
change at center stage of the federal government’s regulatory and policy 
agenda.3 In particular, the Biden Administration has signaled a desire to 
tackle environmental issues not only by enacting new regulatory programs, 
but also by improving environmental enforcement.  Within its first 100 days, 
the Biden Administration issued an Executive Order specifically directing the 
U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) “to develop a comprehensive 
environmental justice enforcement strategy” (emphasis added) and EPA to 
                                                 
3 The Biden-Harris Administration Immediate Priorities, THE WHITE HOUSE, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/priorities/ (last visited Sept. 16, 2021). 
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“strengthen enforcement of environmental violations” (emphasis added).4  
The stated goal of such an enforcement strategy is to “provide timely 
remedies for systemic environmental violations and contaminations, and 
injury to natural resources.”5 The question, of course, is how the federal 
government will actually achieve such a worthy goal, particularly when 
previous federal administrations have issued very similar Executive Orders 
and still struggled to improve the connection between enforcement and long 
term solutions for environmental justice.6 
This article is one of three by this author that explores challenges with 
environmental enforcement.7 The first article, published in 2020, focuses on 
the final stage of environmental enforcement—remedies.8 It considers the 
many questions that arise when formulating remedies in environmental 
enforcement cases, including the purpose of the remedy, legal authority of 
the enforcer to get the remedy, and who benefits from the remedy. The second 
article, published in 2020, focuses on the beginning stage of environmental 
enforcement—how to find potential violations.9 It examines government 
agencies’ use of information gathering authority, including their ability to 
require monitoring and reporting, to deter and detect potential cheating on 
environmental regulations. This article focuses on the middle stage of 
environmental enforcement—getting from detection to remedy. It argues that 
environmental violations are difficult to prove once identified, particularly 
when regulated entities can use multiple arguments that the environmental 
legal and regulatory system provides, as defenses.    
In noting wide-ranging problems with environmental noncompliance 
by a variety of regulated entities, legal scholars, practitioners, and journalists 
have tried to understand the gaps in enforcement. Indeed, as many note, 
                                                 
4 Tackling the Climate Crisis at Home and Abroad, Exec. Order No. 14,033, 86 Fed. 
Reg. 7619, Sec. 222 (Jan. 27, 2021). 
5 Id.  
6 President Clinton signed Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority 
Populations and Low-Income Populations, on February 11, 1994. Exec. Order No. 12,898, 
59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 16, 1994). The Order instructs each Federal agency to “make 
achieving environmental justice part of its mission” with specific attention to enforcement 
for DOJ and EPA. 
7 The author acknowledges that many aspects of environmental enforcement discussed 
in the three articles, also apply to other areas of public sector oriented enforcement such as 
in consumer protection, market manipulation, or civil rights.   This series of articles however, 
focuses on environmental enforcement issues, particularly government agency and citizen 
suit enforcement under major federal environmental laws dealing with pollution, natural 
resources, and energy delivery/efficiency. 
8 Seema Kakade, Remedial Payments in Agency Enforcement, 44 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 117 (2020). 
9 Seema Kakade & Matt Haber, Detecting Corporate Environmental Cheating, 47 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 772 (2020). 
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significant reasons for the challenges in environmental enforcement are lack 
of government agency resources and political pressures.10 At the detection 
stage alone, enforcement agencies need resources to conduct inspections at 
specific facilities, buy expensive equipment to measure potential violations 
at inspections, and review massive amounts of self-reported data from 
regulated entities.11 Enforcement agencies also need resources, like advanced 
computer technology, to identify complex violations, patterns of non-
compliance across industries, or attempts by regulated entities to outright 
cheat on environmental regulations. Moreover, enforcement agencies can 
face serious political challenges, particularly in pursuing remedies for 
enforcement violations. The Trump Administration, for example, issued 
multiple policies limiting agency authority to seek penalties and injunctive 
relief in enforcement actions.12    
Yet continued focus on resource and political hurdles alone 
shortchanges discussion about the steeper challenges with environmental 
enforcement that relate to the legal and regulatory system itself.13 While 
environmental regulatory design may offer compliance flexibility to 
regulated entities, such flexibility often manifests in extensive exceptions and 
forgiving pollution limits, creating obstacles for actual enforcement.14 While 
environmental statutes may provide enforcement authority for federal 
agencies, state agencies, and citizen groups, in reality the preemption and 
preclusion doctrines often impede actual enforcement.15 Regulatory and legal 
                                                 
10 Naveena Sadasivam, Inside Biden’s Uphill Battle to Restore the EPA After Trump, 
THE GRIST (Mar. 1, 2021), https://grist.org/politics/epa-joe-biden-environmental-law-
enforcement-trump/ (discussing long term decline in funding and shifting political priorities 
for environmental enforcement since the 1990s). 
11 Indeed, in a May 4, 2021 internal EPA memo, the EPA Acting Assistant Administrator 
for Enforcement told federal enforcement staff to increase its inspections and take action 
where state enforcement officials are not acting fast enough.  See Kelsey Brugger, Internal 
EPA Memo Urges Agents to Up Inspections, E&E NEWS (May 4, 2021), 
https://www.eenews.net/greenwire/2021/05/04/stories/1063731691 (“[I]f there is a situation 
where a community’s health may be impacted by noncompliance and our co-regulator is not 
taking timely or appropriate action, we should not hesitate to step in and take necessary 
action,” the memo reads.). 
12 David J. Hayes, The Vanishing Federal Role in Enforcing our Environmental Laws, 
THE REG REVIEW (Oct. 12, 2020), https://www.theregreview.org/2020/10/12/hayes-
vanishing-federal-role-enforcing-environmental-laws/. 
13 Cynthia Giles, Next Generation Compliance Environmental Regulation for the 
Modern Era, HARV. L. SCH. ENV’T & ENERGY L. PROGRAM 3 (2020), 
http://eelp.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/Cynthia-Giles-Intro-FINAL.pdf 
(introducing series of white papers on why the answer to enforcement challenges is in 
effective design of regulations).   
14 Marshal J. Bregar, Regulatory Flexibility and the Administrative State, 32 TULSA L.J. 
325 (1996). 
15 See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Two Elk Generation Partners, 646 F.3d 1258 (10th Cir. 2011); 
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hurdles impede environmental enforcement just as much as resource and 
political hurdles. Moreover, as this article discusses, resource and political 
hurdles are often intertwined with regulatory and legal hurdles.    
Despite these difficulties surrounding enforcement, several 
environmental statutes, regulations, and guidance documents explicitly 
include the concept of “enforceability.” Such inclusion demonstrates an 
intent by drafters to create environmental laws that can actually be enforced. 
For example, environmental statues like the Clean Air Act (CAA) and the 
Clean Water Act (CWA) require states to have plans for implementation of 
pollution programs that are “enforceable.”16 Guidance implementing the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) refers to “enforceable” 
mitigation measures during the environmental review process for major 
federal actions.17 Further, pollution-trading programs, such as in greenhouse 
gas regulation, require that credits be quantifiable, verifiable, permanent, and 
“enforceable.”18 As this article describes, such term “enforceable” has limited 
meaning without recognition of the hurdles in the way to actual enforcement. 
The point of this article is not to suggest that there should be no 
hurdles to environmental enforcement. Indeed, there are good reasons that 
regulatory flexibility, evidentiary standards, and the preemption and 
preclusion doctrines exist.19 It is important, however, to acknowledge that 
such hurdles exist and manifest as powerful defenses for regulated entities 
that become defendants in enforcement matters.20 Without an 
acknowledgment of real hurdles in enforcement, broader conversations 
around strengthening environmental enforcement cannot go beyond (albeit 
important) resource concerns. The defense, for example, of “the 
environmental regulation allows me to pollute” is a tough one for any 
enforcement agency to manage, even with all the resources and political 
                                                 
Empire Pipeline v. Town of Pendleton, 472 F. Supp. 3d 25 (W.D.N.Y. 2020). 
16 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)-(k). 
17 Memorandum from Nancy H. Sutley, Chair of the CEQ, to Heads of Federal 
Departments and Agencies 7 n.18 (Jan. 14, 2011), 
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2017/06/f35/NEPA-
CEQ_Mitigation_and_Monitoring_Guidance_14Jan2011.pdf (“This guidance approves of 
the use of the ‘mitigated FONSI’ when the NEPA process results in enforceable mitigation 
measures.”). 
18 See, e.g., Rule 250-301 Sacramento Carbon Exchange Program (adopted Mar. 25, 
2010), http://www.airquality.org/ProgramCoordination/Documents/rule250.pdf (“To be 
certified as carbon credits, the emission reductions shall meet the requirements of an 
approved protocol for a specific project type and consider any Sacramento specific 
conditions or requirements to be real, additional, quantifiable, verifiable, permanent, and 
enforceable.”).    
19 See Section II, infra. 
20 See Section II, infra. 
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support in the world.21 Furthermore, without acknowledging such a barrier, 
local communities have difficulty grasping the reasons behind why 
environmental enforcement fails to meet their hopes and expectations. 
This article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides background on 
environmental regulations, compliance, noncompliance, and enforcement as 
related but distinct topics. Part II describes the resource, regulatory, and legal 
hurdles that enforcers face in pursuing environmental violations, particularly 
as related to pollution (and pollution abatement) standards. Part III 
demonstrates how enforcement hurdles manifest in one case study of 
significant environmental noncompliance: tampering with air emissions 
controls on cars and trucks. Part IV identifies the term “enforceable” and its 
usage in key federal environmental statutes and argues for a consistent and 
deliberate use of the term in a way that reflects an understanding of the 
hurdles that arise as defenses in later enforcement cases. The article then 
concludes with remarks on the broader applicability of environmental 




It is impossible to talk about environmental enforcement without first 
understanding a bit about the historical and current context of environmental 
regulation and compliance with such regulation. Enforcement only exists if a 
there is a law or regulation to enforce in the first place. Enforcement also only 
exists if there is noncompliance, but as this section describes, identifying and 
proving noncompliance is often complicated. Such an understanding is 
important for ultimately addressing enforcement hurdles.   
 
A.  Law and Regulation 
 
In the United States, the current model of environmental regulation 
focuses heavily on reducing costs for industry. As scholars have noted, all 
social and economic regulation began to receive significant pushback in the 
twentieth century in response to the expansion of regulation that occurred 
during the New Deal and postwar periods.22 Presidents Ford and Carter made 
inroads in the 1970’s to advance environmental protection through new laws 
                                                 
21 Stuart Parker, EPA Faults Texas Air Permits Amid Looming Fights Over Trump-Era 
Policy, INSIDEEPA (Aug. 9, 2021) (EPA Administrator Michael Regan in recent decisions 
has twice faulted Texas air regulators for their failure to ensure state-issued air quality 
permits are fully enforceable but the instant disputes did not present an opportunity for the 
agency to address environmentalists’ broader calls to reverse a Trump-era policy of deferring 
to state permit decisions.”). 
22 Jodi L. Short, The Paranoid Style in Regulatory Reform, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 633, 639–
40 (2012). 
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and regulations. However, President Reagan pursued a comprehensive policy 
of regulatory pushback by consolidating regulatory oversight in the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) and requiring agencies to justify proposed 
rules on the basis of the relative costs and benefits they were expected to 
generate.23 To this day, cost-benefit analysis has shaped a federal 
environmental regulatory system that is complex and varied in its 
requirements.24 As described in Table 1 below, federal environmental 
regulations involve a mix of different kinds of regulated entities and 
government agencies. An environmental regulation may issue from a federal 
agency across any number of subject specific executive branch mission areas, 
including environment, securities, consumer protection, zoning, and energy. 
An environmental regulation may target an industry entity as the regulated 
entity, but also might target a government agency entity.25 An environmental 
regulation may include substantial requirements for regulated entities, such 
as mandating significant capital expenditures for pollution control 
equipment, or may merely include recordkeeping requirements.26 Further 
complicating Table 1 is the fact that the listed types of environmental 
regulations are not mutually exclusive, but rather overlap and intertwine.   
  
                                                 
23 Id. at 639–40; Helen G. Boutrous, Regulatory Review in the Obama Administration: 
Cost-Benefit Analysis for Everyone, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 243, 255–56 (2010); Daniel A. 
Farber, Regulatory Review in Anti-Regulatory Times, 94 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 383 (2019). 
24 Table 1 largely adapts from a 1995 document assessing mechanism for how 
government encourages or forces facilities to achieve society’s environmental goals. See 
Environmental Policy Tools: A User’s Guide, U.S. CONGRESS OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY 
ASSESSMENT (1995), https://ota.fas.org/reports/9517.pdf.  
25 G. Nelson Smith, III, Lawmaker as Lawbreaker: Enforcement Actions Against 
Municipalities for Failure to Comply with the Clean Air Act, 41 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 685, 712 
(1993). 
26 See, e.g., Prevention of Significant Deterioration Basic Information, US EPA, 
https://www.epa.gov/nsr/prevention-significant-deterioration-basic-information (last visited 
Sept. 16, 2021) (discussing regulatory requirements that require installation of pollution 
controls); Recordkeeping and Reporting Requirements for Stationary Refrigeration, US 
EPA, https://www.epa.gov/section608/recordkeeping-and-reporting-requirements-
stationary-refrigeration (last visited Sept. 16, 2021) (discussing regulations that require 
recordkeeping and reporting).   
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Table 1: Common Types of Federal Environmental Regulations 
 
Type Description 
Performance-Based  Describe required end results, leaving regulated 
entities free to choose compliance methods. 
Design Describe required emissions limits based on what 
a model technology might achieve; regulated 
entities use the model technology or demonstrate 
that another approach achieves equivalent results. 
Technology Specify the technology or technique a regulated 
entity must use to control its pollution. 
Integrated 
Permitting 
Incorporate multiple requirements into a single 
permit rather than having a permit for each 
individual emissions source at a facility. 
Trackable Emissions Allow regulated entities to trade emission control 
responsibilities among themselves, provided the 
aggregate regulatory cap on emissions is met. 
Challenge 
Regulations 
Give target group of sources responsibility for 
designing and implementing a program to achieve 
a target goal, with a government-imposed program 
or sanction if goal is unmet by the deadline. 
Pollution Charges Require regulated entity to pay fixed dollar 
amount for each unit of pollution emitted or 
disposed; no ceiling on emissions. 
Liability Require entities causing pollution that adversely 
affects others to compensate those harmed to the 




Require entities to report (either publicly or in 
response to government subpoena) emissions, 
discharge, or product information. 
Bans  Ban or restrict manufacture, distribution, use, or 




Require government agencies (or indirectly, 
industry project applicants) to assess the 
environmental impact of a proposed project that 
receives government funding. 
Corporate 
Disclosure 
Require certain private corporate entities to 
disclose risks to shareholders and securities filings.  
Environmental 
Advertising 
Require truth in advertising regarding 
environmental attributes of products. 
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B.  Noncompliance 
 
The complexity of environmental regulations makes for an even more 
complex picture of noncompliance with those regulations. There is simply no 
easy way to assess broad-level noncompliance rates because doing so is 
always dependent upon so many factors.27 Certainly, some legal scholars 
have opined that particular types of environmental regulations may allow for 
higher rates of noncompliance than other types of regulation.28 However, in 
general, compliance with both paperwork (e.g. recordkeeping and reporting) 
and physical (e.g. disposal and discharge) regulations are difficult to assess 
and to achieve.29 Moreover, the many kinds of noncompliance that exist, from 
mistakes to outright cheating, mean that noncompliance data alone does not 
always give a complete picture.  
First, noncompliance rates depend on information.30 For 
environmental statutes and regulations that require self-monitoring and self-
reporting of violations, determining compliance rates is much easier than 
those that do not.31 Indeed, Cynthia Giles, the former head of compliance and 
enforcement at EPA in the Obama Administration, has stressed in her 
research and writing the importance of established and reliable measurement 
                                                 
27 CYNTHIA GILES, PART 2: NONCOMPLIANCE WITH ENVIRONMENTAL RULES IS WORSE 
THAN YOU THINK 5 (Apr. 14, 2020), http://eelp.law.harvard.edu/wp-
content/uploads/Cynthia-Giles-Part-2-FINAL.pdf.    
28 Cary Coglianese, The Limits of Performance Based Regulation, 50 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 525 (2017) (performance based measures depend on the ability of government 
agencies to specify, measure, and monitor performance, and reliable and appropriate 
information about performance may sometimes be difficult or impossible to obtain); Lesley 
K. McAllister, Putting Persuasion Back in the Equation: Compliance in Cap and Trade 
Programs, 24 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 299, 309 (2007) (“Compliance under the Clean Air Act 
was more difficult to assess than under other traditional technology-based regulation such as 
the Clean Water Act, in part because permits were not required for individual sources[.]”). 
29 J.B. Ruhl et al., Environmental Compliance: Another Integrity Crisis or Too Many 
Rules?, 17 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 24–26 (2002). 
30 Michael E. Wall, Is There a Proper Level of Compliance with Environmental Law?, 
39 ABA TRENDS, Jan./Feb. 2008, at 13. 
31 See EPA OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, REP. NO. 16-P-0164, CLEAN AIR ACT 
FACILITY EVALUATIONS ARE CONDUCTED, BUT INACCURATE DATA HINDER EPA 
OVERSIGHT AND PUBLIC AWARENESS (May 3, 2016) (noting how insufficient or absent data 
frustrates EPA’s ability to effectively evaluate compliance); In a 2007 report, EPA OIG 
recognized that the lack of mandatory reporting of compliance data collected by the States 
inhibited EPA’s ability to create nationwide compliance statistics. EPA OFFICE OF 
INSPECTOR GENERAL, REP. NO. 2007-P-0027, OVERCOMING OBSTACLES TO MEASURING 
COMPLIANCE: PRACTICES IN SELECTED FEDERAL AGENCIES (2007); D.R. van der Vaart & 
John C. Evans, Compliance Under Title V: Yes, No, or I Don’t Know?, 12 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 
22–24 (2002) (describing data reporting in demonstrating compliance under Title V of 
CAA). 
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systems in ensuring compliance with environmental regulations.32 Scholars 
that discuss enforcement have also typically focused on monitoring tools for 
agency enforcers to achieve goals, emphasizing tools such as electronic 
reporting and third-party verification.33 For example, publicly available 
monitoring and reporting of water discharges for a variety of pollutants has 
generated robust noncompliance data in the context of CWA violations.34 In 
contrast, because monitoring and reporting is state specific under the CAA, 
there is not a readily available way to identify the extent of a regulated 
entity’s compliance and noncompliance with respect to air permits.35 Much 
of the data on noncompliance too is anecdotal from inspectors and news 
stories.36 
Second, because environmental regulations allow significant latitude 
on what qualifies as a “requirement” to begin with, noncompliance is tough 
to assess. When an environmental regulation undergoes a cost-benefit 
analysis, the costs to the regulated entities must be evaluated. Accordingly, a 
key goal of the regulation becomes finding ways to make compliance easier 
for those entities.37 Simply put, compliance with environmental regulations 
is expensive and providing flexibility for regulated entities on how, when, 
and where to comply eases the expense.38 As a result, some environmental 
regulations impose voluntary standards instead of actual requirements or 
                                                 
32 Cynthia Giles, Next Generation Compliance Environmental Regulation for the 
Modern Era, HARV. L. SCH. ENV’T & ENERGY L. PROGRAM 3 (2020), 
http://eelp.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/Cynthia-Giles-Intro-FINAL.pdf.  
33 David L. Markell et al., Dynamic Governance in Theory and Practice, Part I, 58 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 563, 569–70 (2016).  
34 See, e.g., JAY SHIMSHACK, MONITORING, ENFORCEMENT, & ENVIRONMENTAL 
COMPLIANCE: UNDERSTANDING SPECIFIC & GENERAL DETERRENCE (June 2009), 
https://archive.epa.gov/compliance/resources/reports/compliance/research/web/pdf/meec-
whitepaper-task6.pdf; Clifford Rechtschaffen, Enforcing the Clean Water Act in the Twenty-
First Century: Harnessing the Power of the Public Spotlight, 55 ALA. L. REV. 775, 802–05 
(2004) (discussing efficacy of EPA ECHO’s online reporting site in assessing 
noncompliance). 
35 Adam Babich, The Unfilled Promise of Effective Air Quality and Emissions 
Monitoring, 30 GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. 569, 590 (2018); but note that facilities subject to Title 
V of the CAA require compliance certifications and reporting of deviations, see 40 C.F.R. 
§ 70.6.   
36 Sharon Buccino & Steve Jones, Controlling Water Pollution from Coalbed Methane 
Drilling: An Analysis of Discharge Requirements, 4 WYO. L. REV. 559, 576 (2004) (citing 
to news article discussing how inspector could perform a compliance inspection on each 
coalbed methane site only once during the five-year lifetime of the relevant water permit). 
37 David M. Driesen, Distributing the Costs of Environmental, Health, and Safety 
Protection, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFFS. L. REV. 1, 12 (2005). 
38 See, e.g., Caroline Cecot, Regulatory Fracture Plugging: Managing Risks to Water 
from Shale Development, 6 TEX. A&M L. REV. 29, 44 (2008) (recommending that State 
regulators use cost-benefit analysis to create flexible standards for the natural gas industry). 
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allow regulated entities to pay to pollute. Even where there are requirements, 
some environmental regulations provide freedom of choice for regulated 
entities on how to comply with the requirements or how to demonstrate 
compliance.39 Some environmental permits explicitly exclude certain 
emissions from the limit or make the permit conditions broad to cover any 
flexibility that a regulated facility might argue it needs.40   
Third, part of the complication in assessing noncompliance with 
environmental regulations is that the compliance metric often does not always 
relate directly to actual pollution.41 Noncompliance with an information 
disclosure regulation means that a regulated entity failed to report data. 42  
Noncompliance with a recordkeeping regulation means that a regulated entity 
failed to properly keep or show specific documentation.43 Noncompliance 
with an agency environmental review regulation means that the agency did 
not conduct an adequate analysis.44 Thus, even though the term 
noncompliance or “violation” conjures terrible images of excess pollution, 
particularly when discussing pollution and exposure for communities, such 
is not always the case.    
Fourth, society places varying values on different kinds of 
noncompliance, further complicating noncompliance assessments. Indeed, 
some law-and-economics scholarship suggest that certain laws (e.g. non-
criminal laws) are mere costs of doing business, meaning a certain amount of 
deliberate noncompliance should be encouraged when it satisfies a 
corporation’s fiduciary responsibility to maximize profitability.45 Willful 
                                                 
39 Dalia Patino-Echeverri, Feasibility of Flexible Technology Standards for Existing 
Coal Fired Power Plants and their Implications for New Technology Development, 61 
UCLA L. REV. 1896, 1920 (2014) (discussing e.g. the concept of alternative compliance 
payments in CAA regulation). 
40 See Dietrich Earnhart et al., Discretionary Exemptions from Environmental 
Regulation: Flexibility for Good or for Ill (Resources for the Future Working Paper No. 19-
20, Aug. 2019), https://www.rff.org/publications/working-papers/discretionary-exemptions-
environmental-regulation-flexibility-good-or-ill/.    
41 J.B. Ruhl et al., Environmental Compliance: Another Integrity Crisis or Too Many 
Rules?, 17 NAT. RES. & ENV'T 24–26 (2002). 
42 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Toyota Motor Company to Pay $180 
Million in Settlement for Decade Long Noncompliance with CAA Reporting Requirements 
(Jan. 14, 2021), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/toyota-motor-company-pay-180-million-
settlement-decade-long-noncompliance-clean-air-act.    
43 See, e.g., News Release, U.S. EPA, Corporate Wide Settlement with Lowe’s (Apr. 17, 
2014), https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/reference-news-release-corporate-wide-
settlement-lowes-protects-public-lead-pollution.  
44 Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 756–57 (2004) (quoting Robertson v. 
Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989) (NEPA imposes no duty for 
federal agencies to use an environmental review, it only imposes procedural requirements on 
federal agencies). 
45 Judd F. Sneirson, Shareholder Primacy and Corporate Compliance, 26 FORDHAM 
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noncompliance or fraud by regulated entities may foster a different societal 
sentiment than failure to comply by those entities that simply cannot afford 
to do so.46 Moreover, certain noncompliance that is longer in time, greater in 
amount, or more acute or toxic may be more concerning than other kinds of 
noncompliance.47 Thus, while noncompliance is a single term, it hardly 
denotes a single idea. 
 
C.  Enforcement 
 
When regulated entities fail to comply, or worse, cheat or commit 
fraud, enforcement needs to step in.48 Widespread noncompliance threatens 
achievement of the underlying public health and natural resource benefits that 
the regulation hopes to achieve.49 For example, when multiple countries 
adopted strict fuel standards for oceangoing vessels, many worried that the 
health benefits anticipated by the standards would never come to fruition 
because of rampant expected noncompliance.50 In addition, while some may 
                                                 
ENVTL. L. REV. 450 (2015). 
46 KRISTI PULLEN FEDINICK ET AL., NATURAL RESOURCE DEFENSE COUNCIL, WATERED 
DOWN JUSTICE 33 (2019), https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/watered-down-justice-
report.pdf (noting difference between willful non-compliance by water utilities versus those 
that want to comply but have financial inability to do so and thus need grant funding); see 
also Judd F. Sneirson, Shareholder Primacy and Corporate Compliance, 26 FORDHAM 
ENVTL. L. REV. 450 (2015) (“And to the extent firms find themselves out of compliance, it 
seems to be more a function of not understanding often-complex laws than a conscious 
choice to flout the law in order to maximize profits.”). 
47 FEDINICK ET AL., supra note 46, at 6 (between 2016-2019, 40 percent of Americans 
obtained their water from drinking water systems that were in violation of the Safe Drinking 
Water Act and the percentage of water systems in chronic noncompliance was 40 percent 
higher in counties with the highest racial, ethnic, and language vulnerability compared to 
counties with the lowest racial, ethnic, and language vulnerability); see also Manju Menon 
& Kanchi Kohli, Regulatory Reforms to Address Non-Compliance, CENTER FOR POLICY 
RESEARCH (June 7, 2019), https://cprindia.org/policy-challenge/7857/climate-energy-and-
the-environment (discussing large-scale legal violations in specific sectors such as 
mining).  
48 Markell et al., supra note 33, at 581 (pointing to example of enforcement working in 
discussing Norway study that found that parties audited by regulators were 37% less likely 
to be in noncompliance the following year). 
49 Cynthia Giles, Next Generation Compliance Environmental Regulation for the 
Modern Era, HARV. L. SCH. ENV’T & ENERGY L. PROGRAM 3 (2020), 
http://eelp.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/Cynthia-Giles-Intro-FINAL.pdf. 
50 See JACK JORDAN ET AL., TACKLING 2020: THE IMPACT OF THE IMO AND HOW 
SHIPOWNERS CAN DEAL WITH TIGHTER SULFUR LIMITS 8 (May 2017), 
https://www.spglobal.com/platts/plattscontent/_assets/_files/en/specialreports/shipping/sr-
tackling-2020-imo-impact-shipowners-tighter-sulfur-limits.pdf (describing that at an 
industry conference, more than 30% of respondents to a poll said there would be some degree 
of non-compliance in emission control areas in 2020). 
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assume that regulated entities relish the opportunity to avoid compliance (and 
some likely do), a lack of enforcement also creates uncertainty in the overall 
marketplace, which ultimately hurts regulated entities.51 For example, as 
EPA’s Deputy Inspector General noted in May 2021, a decline in 
environmental enforcement actions means that violators get “an unfair 
competitive advantage over other regulated entities that comply with 
environmental regulations.”52 Thus, some enforcement regime must exist to 
keep noncompliance in check.53  
Indeed, most federal statutes with a regulatory focus provide certain 
“enforcers” with legal authority to bring environmental enforcement actions. 
Federal statutes certainly provide federal and state government enforcers with 
authority to bring enforcement actions against regulated entities in order to 
obtain injunctive relief and penalties.54 Federal statutes also allow private 
individuals to step into the shoes of government enforcers via citizen suits by 
bringing enforcement actions against regulated entities in order to obtain 
injunctive relief and penalties.55 In addition, federal statutes authorize 
administrative enforcement actions through, for example, administrative 
hearing officers and administrative law judges.56 Such administrative 
environmental enforcement occurs in a variety of administrative court 
functions, in front of zoning boards, pollution control boards, water boards, 
and others.57 There is indeed plenty of enforcement authority available.  
Yet, despite the availability of enforcement authority, it is strikingly 
lacking as a tool to deal with noncompliance. For years, the Office of 
Inspector General (OIG) has discussed concerns over underperformance of 
environmental enforcement in the face of significant noncompliance.58 In 
                                                 
51 See, e.g., Emissions Monitoring: Maintaining a Level Playing Field Post-2020, 
RIVERIA NEWSLETTERS  (Sept. 17, 2018), 
https://www.rivieramm.com/opinion/opinion/emissions-monitoring-maintaining-a-level-
playing-field-post-2020-23341 (“Compliance with the sulphur cap with be challenging 
enough in itself, but a further concern involves the competitive advantage gained from illegal 
non-compliance”). 
52 Kelsey Brugger, Watchdog: Enforcement Inspections, Monitoring Plummeted, E&E 
NEWS (May 13, 2021).   
53 David L. Markell & Robert L. Glicksman, A Holistic Look at Agency Enforcement, 
93 N.C. L. REV. 1, 11–12 (2014).  
54 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7413 (CAA federal enforcement); 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (CWA 
federal enforcement); 42 U.S.C. § 6928 (RCRA federal enforcement). 
55 The “private attorney general” where such individual simulates an attorney general, 
acting as the advocate for a group, but solely for a group of private persons. 
56 Joseph J. Lisa, EPA Enforcement Actions: An Introduction to the Consolidated Rules 
of Practice, 24 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 1 (2005). 
57 See, e.g., Joseph F. Guida & Jean M. Flores, From Here to a Penalty: Anatomy of 
EPA Civil Administrative Enforcement, 43 TEX. ENVTL. L.J. 129 (2013). 
58 David L. Markell & Robert L. Glicksman, Dynamic Governance in Theory and 
Application: Part I, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 563, 590-91 (2016). 
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2016, the OIG specifically noted that “[s]tate enforcement programs are 
underperforming: EPA data indicate that noncompliance is high and the level 
of enforcement is low.”59 The most recent report by EPA’s Inspector General 
in May 2021 found that from 2006 to 2018, EPA's enforcement office 
reported a decline in enforcement activities.60 The questions for this article 
are why enforcement is deficient and how to strengthen enforcement in the 
long-term.  
II. HURDLES TO ENFORCEABILITY 
 
This section focuses on existing hurdles in environmental 
enforcement. In particular it discusses resource and political, regulatory, and 
legal difficulties, as distinct, and also intertwined hurdles to enforceability of 
environmental law. The purpose in describing these hurdles is to provide an 
overview of the quantity and complexity of issues that must be addressed in 
order to achieve long-term and real enforcement. 
 
A.  Resource and Political Hurdles  
 
As this article and many others have noted, a very real reason for 
enforcement’s lackluster performance is due to resource hurdles.61 For 
example, in a specific study on the CAA, Professor Victor Flatt looked at 
self-reported compliance data from regulated entities in the early 2000s to 
show that state spending per capita directly affects the length of time a 
regulated facility is in violation of the CAA.62 In essence, the environmental 
enforcement system simply has far too much on its plate to keep up. As noted 
by Cynthia Giles, the head of EPA’s enforcement office in the Obama 
Administration, “a handful of enforcers will never be able to ensure general 
compliance at millions of facilities.”63 As noted by Joel Mintz, a legal scholar 
on environmental enforcement, at a 2017 symposium, EPA and the states are 
now responsible for regulating a much larger universe of pollution sources 
                                                 
59 Id. at 591. 
60 Kelsey Brugger, Watchdog: Enforcement Inspections, Monitoring Plummeted, E&E 
NEWS (May 13, 2021).   
61 Jonathan Remy Nash et al., The Production Function of the Regulatory State, How 
Much do Agency Budgets Matter?, 102 MINN. L. REV. 695, 709 (2017) (noting that decreased 
even though decreases in budgets may not affect environmental quality, they certainly affect 
enforcement. 
62 Victor B. Flatt & Paul M. Collins, Jr., Environmental Enforcement in Dire Straits: 
There Is No Protection for Nothing and No Data for Free, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 55, 82 
(2009) (looking at). 
63 Cynthia Giles, Next Generation Compliance Environmental Regulation for the 
Modern Era Part I, HARV. L. SCH. ENV’T & ENERGY L. PROGRAM 3 (2020), 
http://eelp.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/Cynthia-Giles-Part-1-FINAL.pdf.  
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than was true in previous years, and in a wider array of new program areas.64   
Core functions of enforcement like sending subpoenas, records review, and 
inspection, are simply expensive to undertake consistently and 
comprehensively.65 
Indeed, there are plans for an increased enforcement budget in the 
Biden Administration. EPA’s proposed $11.2 billion budget request for fiscal 
year 2022, for example, includes plans to “hold bad actors accountable for 
their violations, with a particular focus in communities with multiple 
pollution sources.”66 Yet EPA, even with increased budgets, relies heavily on 
state enforcement activities, and state enforcement budgets have also seen a 
significant decline in recent years.67 As described in one study, states bring 
about ninety percent of environmental enforcement actions each year, and yet 
only eight states had satisfied an EPA goal that all major air pollution emitters 
be inspected every two years and only two states had satisfied an EPA goal 
that all large-quantity generators of hazardous waste be inspected every five 
years.68 Further, given history as a guide, budgets are likely to change again 
in the future, meaning that resources will continue to remain a significant 
hurdle for effective environmental enforcement.69    
Moreover, political hurdles also undoubtedly impede environmental 
enforcement policy.70 In the context of enforcement provisions in 
environmental permits, EPA has either allowed federal objections to state 
permits or disallowed any federal “second-guessing” of state permit terms, 
depending on the political administration in power.71 For example, under the 
                                                 
64 DOJ Symposium, The Future of Environmental Enforcement, 47 ENVTL. L. REP. 
NEWS & ANALYSIS 10,206, 10,209-10 (2017) (remarks by Joel Mintz). 
65 Lucas Satterlee, Climate Drones: A New Tool for Oil and Gas Air Emission 
Monitoring, 46 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 11,069 (2016) (discussing drones for use 
in enforcement inspections to check compliance with the CAA in the oil and gas sector). 
66 FY 2022 EPA BUDGET IN BRIEF 11 (2021), 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2021-05/documents/fy-2022-epa-bib.pdf   
67  
68 INSTITUTE FOR POLICY INTEGRITY-NYU SCHOOL OF LAW, IRREPLACEABLE: WHY 
STATES CAN’T AND WON’T MAKE UP FOR INADEQUATE ENFORCEMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAWS 1–2 (2017), https://policyintegrity.org/files/media/EPA_Enforcement_June2017.pdf. 
69 Professor Joel Mintz has also stated “to pursue civil environmental enforcement in an 
effective fashion, EPA needs generally adequate budgetary resources and a sufficient number 
of qualified enforcement personnel.” DOJ Symposium, supra note 64, at 10,209. 
70 See, e.g., ENVIRONMENTAL INTEGRITY PROJECT, PAYING LESS TO POLLUTE: A YEAR 
OF ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT UNDER TRUMP (2018), 
https://www.environmentalintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Enforcement-
Report.pdf (discussing changes in environmental enforcement across multiple federal 
Administrations).  
71 Stuart Parker, EPA Faults Texas Air Permits Amid Looming Fight Over Trump Era 
Policy, INSIDEEPA (Aug. 9, 2021), https://insideepa.com/daily-news/epa-faults-texas-air-
permits-amid-looming-fight-over-trump-era-policy. 
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Obama Administration, EPA’s practice had been to allow objections to state 
issued permits, including where the permits had weak enforcement 
provisions, such as monitoring and recordkeeping requirements.72 Yet, under 
the Trump Administration, EPA established a policy that EPA cannot 
“second guess” states’ permitting decisions.73 EPA has also changed its 
position across differing federal administrations with regards to remedies 
available in enforcement matters, specifically supplemental environmental 
projects and mitigation. 74 Other enforcement policies that have changed over 
political administrations involve limiting non-criminal enforcement actions 
to cases that involve intentional wrongdoing, encouraging restraint in 
pursuing criminal charges, and preventing the pursuit of civil penalties in 
cases where states had already acted.75  
Legal scholarship has certainly acknowledged political hurdles in 
environmental enforcement. Professor Mintz has discussed that even though 
environmental enforcement should be a professional activity, partisan politics 
plays a significant role.76 Professor Cecot has noted that a federal 
administration’s particular stance on enforcement, particularly involving 
statements of nonenforcement, changes the perceived threat of federal 
enforcement thereby impacting state enforcement.77 Professors Outka and 
Warner have described the changes in federal initiation of new enforcement 
actions, under Presidents Bush, Obama, and Trump.78 Yet, as Professor Jodi 
Short notes, the role of politics features much more prominently in regulatory 
scholarship on agenda setting, rulemaking, policy adoption, policy diffusion, 
and institutional design, rather than in the area of enforcement and 
compliance.79 
 
                                                 
72 Stuart Parker, Environmentalists Urge EPA to ‘Disavow’ Trump Title V Air Permit 
Policy, INSIDE EPA (Mar. 15, 2021), https://insideepa.com/daily-news/environmentalists-
urge-epa-disavow-trump-title-v-air-permit-policy (discussing Texas state permits that have 
repeatedly come under attack by environmental groups for failing to include stringent terms, 
including enforcement related terms).   
73 Id. 
74 Akin Gump Enforcement Alert, Tearing Down Trump’s Environmental Wall: Justice 
Department Ditches Impediments to Effective Enforcement (Feb. 12, 2021), 
https://www.akingump.com/en/news-insights/tearing-down-trumps-enforcement-wall-
justice-department-ditches-trump-policies-seen-as-impediments-to-enforcement.html.    
75 Id.  
76 DOJ Symposium, supra note 64, at 10,209 (remarks of Joel Mintz). 
77
 Caroline Cecot, Filling the Federal Enforcement Gap, 33 NAT. RES. & ENVT. 36 
(2019). 
78 Uma Outka & Elizabeth Kronk Warner, Reversing Course on Environmental Justice 
Under the Trump Administration, 54 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 393, 406 (2019). 
79 Jodi L. Short, The Politics of Regulatory Enforcement and Compliance: Theorizing 
and Operationalizing Political Influences, 15 REGUL. & GOVERNANCE 653 (2021).   
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B.  Regulatory Design Hurdles 
 
There has been even less attention to the way in which regulatory 
hurdles impact environmental enforcement, Yet, environmental enforcers 
also struggle with regulatory hurdles that stem from “flexibility” for regulated 
entities. Such flexibility can come in multiple forms, including via providing 
exceptions for specific classes of regulated entities and setting pollution 
standards that are voluntary rather than numeric.80 Providing flexibility is a 
key way in which executive branch agencies reduce the cost for regulated 
entities to comply with new environmental regulations.81 Yet, as this section 
describes, flexibility in regulatory design hinders enforcement efforts by 
requiring enforcers to overcome affirmative defenses raised by regulated 
entities early on in litigation proceedings. Thus, while some may focus on the 
need for greater resources in order to improve the state of environmental 
enforcement, resources alone will not improve the number or value of 
remedies actually achieved in enforcement cases. Clear and easy regulatory 
defenses simply stand too tall in the enforcer’s path.   
As scholars and researchers of administrative law have noted, 
exceptions are not really exceptions but instead quite prevalent in regulatory 
design.82 For example, the CWA and implementing regulations allow 
variances for wastewater dischargers from water quality limits when 
compliance might cause “substantial and widespread economic and social 
impacts” in communities.83 Additionally, the CAA and its implementing 
regulations allow permit exemptions for regulated facilities that may promise 
to keep emissions below certain threshold levels.84 At state and local levels, 
exemptions are replete in areas of pollution control, particularly as related to 
variances from zoning requirements.85  
                                                 
80 Marshal J. Bregar, Regulatory Flexibility and the Administrative State, 32 TULSA L.J. 
325 (1996).  
81 GAO FAQs, https://www.gao.gov/legal/other-legal-work/congressional-review-act  
(last visited Sept. 16, 2021) (Under the Congressional Review Act (CRA), agencies must 
also submit final rules and supporting analyses to the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) for congressional review prior to promulgation. This submission must indicate 
whether the rule is “major” as defined under the CRA (5 USC §804(2)), which in general, 
involves rules with a $100 million or more impact on the economy).  
82 Cary Coglianese et al., Unrules, 73 STAN. L. REV. 883 (2021); see also David Markell 
& Robert L. Glicksman, A Holistic Look at Agency Enforcement, 93 N.C. L. REV. 1, 15 
(2014) (noting RCRA as an example, where regulatory standards are different between 
hazardous waste standard generators and de minims generators). 
83 Clean Water Act, 40 C.F.R § 131.14. 
84 See, e.g., Wis. Dep’t of Natural Resources.  Some facilities or construction projects at 
existing facilities may have a low enough environmental impact that they are exempt from 
obtaining air pollution permits. 
85 Earnhart et al., supra note 40, at 5. 
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Exceptions translate into clear affirmative defenses in enforcement 
cases. For example, EPA, states, and citizen enforcers grappled with multiple 
exceptions in the 2002 new source review regulations that changed permitting 
requirements for new and modified large sources of air pollution.86 In 
enforcement cases alleging violations of the 2002 regulations, defendants 
made regular and far-reaching arguments that modifications made to facilities 
fit within the routine exception and hence did not need a permit.87 In one 
enforcement case, a coal fired power plant defendant argued that life-
extension modifications that cost millions of dollars were “routine” and hence 
justified to fall under the exception.88 In another enforcement case alleging 
violations of the 2002 regulations, a coal-fired power plant defendant argued 
that all modifications fell within an exception. 89    
Moreover, exceptions can embed in compliance determinations, 
making it easy for defendants to escape liability. For example, air permits that 
set limits for emissions coming from facilities will often exclude emissions 
that the facility generates during startup, shutdown, and malfunction periods 
of facility operation.90 Such startup, shutdown, and malfunction emissions 
can be significant, and simply go unmeasured and unaccounted for in the 
permit. In other situations, the way in which facilities measure compliance 
can allow for excusable exceedances. A permit may allow a facility that meets 
an emission limit ninety five percent of its operating time to be considered 
“in compliance.”91 During the other five percent of the time, the facility can 
exclude emissions when monitors might be in testing or failure, if there is a 
facility upset condition, or the pollution control equipment is going through 
cleaning.92 While such “excused” emissions may seem reasonable when 
drafting a permit, they often become easy defenses for defendants in 
enforcement cases later that allege noncompliance.93    
                                                 
86 67 Fed. Reg. 80,185 (Dec. 31, 2002). 
87 For excellent student note on the routine exception’s implications in enforcement 
cases, see Graham Zorn, Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Its Routine 
Maintenance Exception, 33 VT. L. REV. 783 (2009).   
88 Wis. Elec. Power Co. v. Reilly, 893 F.2d 901, 906 (7th Cir. 1990). 
89 United States v. DTE Energy Co., 711 F.3d 643 (6th Cir. 2013).    
90 Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Ill. Power Res., LLC, 202 F. Supp. 3d 859, 883–84 (C.D. 
Ill. 2016) (pointing out that defendants argued that the vast majority of the exceedances at 
issue are excusable under the Illinois SIP because they occurred during periods of 
malfunction and breakdown, and noting several other states with similar provisions, 
including Georgia and Texas). 
91 United States v. Louisiana Pacific Corp., 908 F. Supp. 835 (D. Colo. 1995).    
92 Id.  
93 Sierra Club v. Georgia Power, 365 F. Supp. 2d 1297 (11th Cir. 2006) (regulated entity 
argued that provision of its air pollution permit acknowledging state's enforcement discretion 
regarding excess emissions during startup, shutdown, or malfunction was an affirmative 
defense available to the plant operator in a citizen suit under Clean Air Act (CAA)). 
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Moreover, under certain federal environmental laws, once a permit is 
issued with or without its flexibilities, a “shield” protects the permit holder 
from strict liability for unauthorized discharges. 94 The idea behind a permit 
shield is to relieve permit holders of having to litigate in an enforcement 
action the question of whether their permits are sufficiently strict.95 The 
permit shield defense applies “as long as (1) the permit holder complies with 
the express terms of the permit and with the Clean Water Act’s disclosure 
requirements and (2) the permit holder does not make a discharge of 
pollutants that was not within the reasonable contemplation of the permitting 
authority at the time the permit was granted.”96 Thus, if the permit is based 
upon accurate information, it is valid. Only if the defendant withheld relevant 
information in the permit process would the permit not be valid.97  
The permit shield has been a common defense in water permits 
involving national water quality standards. For example, in a 2015 district 
court case in Georgia, the court ruled that Georgia’s narrative water quality 
standards were not incorporated into the Georgia National Pollutant 
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit issued to a pulp mill for 
wastewater discharges.98 Plaintiff environmental group argued that the mill’s 
discharge had a negative impact on the river, and that the discharge violated 
the state’s water quality standards pertaining to color, odor and turbidity.99 
The pulp mill’s defense was that the permit did not incorporate water quality 
standards, and thus the CWA’s “permit shield” provisions shielded it from 
liability under the CWA.100 The court agreed with the pulp mill, granting its 
                                                 
94 NRDC v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 725 F.3d 1194, 1204 (9th Cir. 2013) (if a polluter 
holds a water permit, then compliance with the terms of the permit satisfies its obligations 
and it cannot be liable for discharges in accordance with the permit); see also CWA 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1342(k) (compliance with a permit issued shall be deemed compliance for purposes of any 
citizen suit or government enforcement action). Note, the CAA also includes permit shields 
for permittees.  See MINN. POLLUTION CONTROL AGENCY, FACTS ABOUT APPLICATION AND 
PERMIT SHIELDS (Mar. 1998), https://www.pca.state.mn.us/sites/default/files/2-04.pdf. 
95 Wis. Res. Protection Council v. Flambeau Mining Co., 727 F.3d 700 (N.D. Ill. 2017).  
96 Piney Run Preservation Ass’n v. County Commissioners of Carroll County, 268 F.3d 
255, 259 (4th Cir. 2001); see also NRDC v. County of Los Angeles, 725 F.3d 1194, 1204 
(9th Cir.2013). 
97 42 U.S.C. § 7661c(f) (“Compliance with a permit issued in accordance with this 
subchapter shall be deemed compliance.”); see also example of state permit shield, WIS. 
STAT. § 285.62(10)(b) (“compliance with all emission limitations included in an operation 
permit is considered to be compliance with all emission limitations.”). 
98 Altamaha Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Rayonier Performance Fibers, LLC et al., 2018 WL 
2947915, Case No. A18A0594 (Ga. App. June 13, 2018). 
99 Pulp Mill’s Pollution Discharge Permit Falls Short of Georgia Water Quality 
Standards, SOUTHERN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW CENTER (Jan. 28, 2016), 
https://www.southernenvironment.org/news-and-press/news-feed/pulp-mill-pollution-
discharge-permit-falls-short-of-georgia-water-quality-s.  
100 Altamaha Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Rayonier Performance Fibers, LLC et al., 2018 WL 
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motion for summary judgment on the CWA claims.101 Similarly, in a Sixth 
Circuit case in Kentucky, the court found that a permit shield for a mining 
company protected the company from liability associated with discharges of 
selenium.102 The permit did not specify effluent limitations for selenium and 
the discharge resulted in levels exceeding the threshold in the state's water 
quality.103 Plaintiffs, a citizen group, argued that the permit shield did not 
apply because the discharge of selenium was not expressly authorized by the 
permit nor reasonably contemplated by the state agency when it issued the 
permit.104 The Sixth Circuit disagreed however, shielding the mining 
company from liability.105   
Environmental regulations also exempt regulated facilities from 
needing permits if the facility only emits “minor” sources of pollution. In 
CAA permitting for example, to stay classified as a minor versus major 
source a regulated entity only needs to promise to keep the facility’s pollution 
under minor source pollution thresholds.106 While it may make sense from a 
regulatory perspective to ease permitting burdens for only minor sources of 
pollution, it can be difficult for enforcers to monitor whether a facility 
actually stays below minor source thresholds.107 In Wild Earth Guardians v.  
Extraction Oil and Gas Inc., for example, monitoring and recordkeeping 
became a hot issue in litigation where defendants argued that the plaintiff 
citizen group enforcers could not demonstrate that the facility had exceeded 
                                                 
2947915, Case No. A18A0594 (Ga. App. June 13, 2018). 
101 Id.  
102 Sierra Club v. ICG Hazard, LLC, 781 F.3d 281 (6th Cir. 2015). 
103 Id.  
104 Id.  
105 Sierra Club v. ICG Hazard, LLC, 781 F.3d 281 (6th Cir. 2015); see also Atl. States 
Legal Foundation v. Eastman Kodak Co., 12 F.3d 353 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding the pollutant 
at issue, though not limited by any permit condition, was disclosed and contemplated within 
the permitting process, thus implicitly within the permit and thus regulated entity shielded 
from liability.); but see Northwest Envtl. Advocates v. City of Portland, 56 F.3d 979, 990 
(9th Cir. 1995) (rejecting the argument that water quality standards must be translated into 
specific effluent limitations in order to constitute an enforceable requirement of the permit).   
106 NPCA v. N.D. Dep’t of Envtl Quality, 945 N.W.2d 318 (N.D. 2020) (court upheld 
the state agency’s issuance of a permit to a refinery even though it did not include a numeric 
cap on hazardous air pollutants because the facility’s potential levels of hazardous air 
pollution were below major source thresholds); see also Voigt v. Coyote Creek Mining Co., 
LLC, No. 1:15-CV-00109, 2016 WL 3920045, at *34 (D.N.D. July 15, 2016) (rejecting 
argument that a numeric cap was required when determining a source’s potential to emit in 
the PSD context). 
107 See, e.g., Guidance on Limiting Potential to Emit in New Source Permitting, US EPA, 
5–7 (June 13, 1989), https://www3.epa.gov/ttn/atw/pte/june13_89.pdf (discussing 
enforceability concerns associated with keeping track of minor source thresholds in air 
permitting). 
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air emission limits without specific monitoring.108 At the same time, 
regulated facilities often push back on monitoring requirements as permit 
conditions.109  
At a broader level, the federal government grapples with concerns 
from states that struggle with how to develop enforceable policies and 
mechanisms.110 Under the CAA, the federal government sets the standards 
and states are required to draft a state implementation plan (“SIP”) for EPA 
approval that sets specific measures to achieve the standards, including 
through issuance of source-specific permits.111 Similarly, under the CWA, 
every state must promulgate water quality standards for EPA approval that 
require individual sources to obtain permits.112 State selected implementation 
measures, through permits or other specific pollution reducing programs, 
must be “enforceable” under both the CAA and CWA.113 Yet courts have 
grappled with deciding whether a state pollution reducing measure is 
enforceable when relied upon in a state plan to implement a national pollution 
standard, particularly if the standard is voluntary.114 For example, in Bayview 
Hunters Point Community Advocates v. Metropolitan Transportation 
Commission, several environmental groups challenged the inclusion of a 
voluntary implementation mechanism in the California SIP for lack of 
enforceability as required by the CAA.115 The plan included, as a mechanism 
to meet overall air quality standards in the San Francisco area, the anticipated 
reductions in emissions resulting from a 15% “target” public transportation 
                                                 
108 WildEarth Guardians v. Extraction Oil and Gas Inc., 457 F. Supp. 3d 936, 961–62 
(D. Colo. 2020). 
109 In re Limetree Bay Refining and Limetree Bay Terminals (2021 case pending with 
Environmental Appeals Board involving oil refiner challenge to EPA’s issuance of an air 
permit that requires general air monitoring to ensure compliance with national ambient air 
quality standards). 
110 Memorandum from Peyton Robertson, Water Quality Specialist, NOAA, to State 
Coastal Nonpoint Program Coordinators, Enforceable Policies and Mechanisms for State 
Coastal Nonpoint Source Programs (Jan. 23, 2001), 
https://coast.noaa.gov/data/czm/pollutioncontrol/media/epmmemo.pdf (noting desire to 
work with states in proving flexibility for voluntary programs to qualify as enforceable).   
111 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)-(k). 
112 33 U.S.C. § 1313(a). 
113 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d). 
114 Kenneth J. Adler et al., Using an Emissions Banking and Trading Program to Reduce 
Diesel Emissions, 49 TEX. ENVTL. L.J. 183 (2019) (noting that mobile sources have not 
typically been included in state NOx emissions trading programs (like Texas Commission 
for Environmental Quality’s (TCEQ) Emissions Banking and Trading (EBT) program) 
because of the difficulty in tracking their location and accurately quantifying potential 
emission reductions).   
115 Bayview Hunters Point Community Advocates v. Metropolitan Transportation 
Commission, 366 F. 3d 692 (9th Cir. 2004). 
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ridership increase.116 The Ninth Circuit found that nothing in the 
transportation control measure's language actually required a ridership 
increase by any amount, and that instead the expected ridership increase was 
simply a target, not a promise to attain a ridership increase.117 The ridership 
target relied on “hoped-for increases in productivity” to boost public transit 
use, but because predicting public behavior is unreliable, the Court found that 
the measure was unenforceable and therefore did not comply with the 
CAA.118 By contrast, other cases have found that similar voluntary measures 
in a SIP do meet the CAA’s requirement of enforceability. In BCCA Appeal 
Group v. U.S. EPA, the Fifth Circuit found that a SIP that simply promised 
to make real reductions in the future, without actually specifying particular 
control measures, was good enough to qualify as enforceable and therefore 
did not violate the CAA’s requirements.119 The Fifth Circuit looked to EPA’s 
own interpretation of the CAA allowing limited use of other “means” and 
“techniques,” like future promises, so long as the entire package of measures 
and rules provides for attainment of air quality standards, and the state is 
capable of fulfilling its promise.120 Similarly, in Committee for a Better 
Arvin, et al., v. U.S. EPA, the Ninth Circuit found that California’s SIP, 
relying on a promise by the state to achieve certain emission reductions in the 
future, was enough to meet enforceability requirements.121 The Ninth Circuit 
distinguished Committee for a Better Arvin from Bayview Hunters Point 
Community Advocates, finding that because state commitments to propose 
and adopt emission control measures required government agency action 
rather than action by the public, the measures were enforceable.122 
Moreover, even when pollution standards are required, sometimes 
they are simply too vague for enforcers. Under the CAA, for a permit 
condition to be considered “enforceable as a practical matter,” it must include 
specific criteria such as “applicability, compliance date, specificity of 
conduct, any incorporation by reference, recordkeeping requirements, and 
                                                 
116 Id.  
117 Id.  
118 Bayview, 366 F.3d at 698. 
119 BCCA Appeal Group v. U.S. EPA, 355 F.3d 817 (5th Cir. 2003). 
120 Id. (citing to EPA Final Rule Approving Texas SIP, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,160, 57,177 
(Nov. 14, 2001)). The court referred to EPA’s three factor test in determining whether to 
approve a SIP’s enforceable commitment: (1) whether the commitment addresses a limited 
portion of the SIP; (2) whether the state generally considers is capable of fulfilling its 
commitment; and (3) whether the commitment is for a reasonable and appropriate period of 
time. 
121 Comm. for a Better Arvin v. U.S. EPA, 786 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2014), a group of 
environmental and community groups brought a challenge against the State of California for 
relying on unenforceable measures to meet air quality standards for the San Joaquin valley, 
an area with some of the worst air quality in the country. 
122 Id. at 1180. 
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exemptions and exceptions.”123 In cases brought by EPA to enforce air permit 
limits, regulated entities have argued as a defense that the limit is not 
enforceable as a practical matter because it is too vague.124 In NPCA v. 
NDEQ, however, the state Supreme Court of North Dakota held that an 
emission limit for a refinery did not need to be numeric in order to still be 
enforceable.125 The court based its reasoning on the fact that nothing in 
applicable state or federal law required the state to specify a numeric cap for 
a limit.126 Similarly, under the CWA, water quality standards can be either 
narrative or numeric.127 Indeed, some scholars have argued for the adoption 
of numeric water quality criteria as preferable to narrative criteria, which are 
vaguer and less susceptible to enforcement.128 
Moreover, new environmental regulations can face opposition at the 
outset due to concerns that such new regulations will require more resources 
to enforce. This issue arose in arguments made by the state of Colorado in a 
2020 case before the Tenth Circuit regarding EPA’s Navigable Waters 
Protection regulation.129 In its request that the court enjoin EPA from 
implementing the new regulation, the state of Colorado presented increased 
enforcement burden as evidence of harm. In particular, the state’s clean water 
program manager asserted that implementation of the regulation would 
require Colorado to eventually take enforcement action, and because the state 
lacked dedicated funding to undertake such an enforcement effort, the state 
would have to divert resources from other clean water programs to the 
detriment of those programs.130 While the court found the testimony by the 
program manager to be lacking in specificity, and as a result, found 
insufficient evidence for the state to demonstrate harm, it is indicative of the 
very real need for consideration of the availability of state enforcement 
budgets and resources in new federal regulations.131 In another example, 
multiple state agencies fought against the 2002 CAA new source review 
proposed regulation, arguing in part that the regulation’s weak recordkeeping 
requirements for regulated entities would hinder enforcement efforts by 
increasing the burden on states.132   
                                                 
123 54 Fed. Reg. 27,274, 27,283 (June 26, 1989). 
124 United States v. EKPC, 498 F. Supp. 2d 995, 1003 (E.D. Ky. 2007). 
125 NPCA v. N.D. Dep’t of Envtl Quality, 945 N.W.2d 318 (N.D. 2020).  
126 Id. at 27, 30. 
127 40 C.F.R. § 131.3(b) (2002). 
128 Julie Furr Youngman, Water, Water, Anywhere?: Protecting Water Quantity in State 
Water Quality Standards, 94 IND. L.J. 1613 (2019). 
129 State v. U.S. EPA, 2021 WL 790999 (10th Cir. 2021). 
130 Id. at *7. 
131 Id. at *8 (to constitute irreparable harm, an injury must be imminent, certain, actual 
and not speculative). 
132 New Jersey v. EPA, 989 F.3d 1038 (2021). 
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C.  Legal Hurdles  
 
In addition to regulatory hurdles, certain legal arguments also present 
difficulties for environmental enforcers. In particular, the doctrines of 
preclusion and preemption pose significant legal hurdles for environmental 
enforcers. Defendants typically raise both of these arguments as affirmative 
defenses in environmental enforcement litigations.133 First, defendants will 
argue that preclusion prevents enforcers from bringing an enforcement action 
because of a prior resolved enforcement case involving the same issue.  
Second, defendants will argue that preemption prevents enforcers from 
bringing an enforcement case because a higher authority of law exists that 
conflicts with the enforcement action, thereby displacing the action.     
Preclusion arguments can be raised in a number of contexts. Several 
environmental statutes preclude citizen enforcement actions when a state has 
commenced and is diligently prosecuting an action under a comparable state 
law in court.134 Some federal statutes also provide that prior state 
administrative enforcement actions can bar the filing of a citizen suit 
addressing the same violations. Preclusion arguments most commonly arise 
with citizen suit enforcers.135 However, government enforcers can also face 
preclusion defenses136 For example, under the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act (RCRA), federal enforcers have faced preclusion issues when 
a state has reached agreement on its own enforcement action.137 In Harmon 
Industries, the Eighth Circuit found that the plain language of the RCRA 
showed a congressional intent for an authorized state program to supplant the 
                                                 
133 An affirmative defense to a civil lawsuit or criminal charge is a fact or set of facts 
other than those alleged by the plaintiff, which, if proven by the defendant, defeats or 
mitigates the legal consequences of the defendant’s otherwise unlawful conduct.  
134 In general, citizens are precluded from filing a suit if the EPA or State has 
commenced and is diligently prosecuting a civil or criminal action in a court of the United 
States a pollution standard at issue in the citizen suit. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B); 42 
U.S.C. § 300j-8(b)(1)(B) (Safe Drinking Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 9659(d)(2) (CERCLA); 42 
U.S.C. § 7604(b)(1)(B) (Clean Air Act); 15 U.S.C. § 2619(b)(1)(B) (TSCA); 42 U.S.C. 
§ 11046(e), (h)(2) (Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act). 
135 See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Two Elk Generation Partners, 646 F.3d 1258 (10th Cir. 2011) 
(finding a CAA citizen suit action precluded under the common law doctrine of issue 
preclusion); Friends of Milwaukee’s Rivers v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 382 F.3d 
743 (7th Cir. 2004) (considering the doctrine of claim preclusion in a CWA citizen suit 
action) 
136 See generally William Daniel Benton, Application of Res Judicata and Collateral 
Estoppel to EPA Overfiling, 16 B.C. ENVTL. AFFS. L. REV. 199 (1988) (discussing preclusion 
in government enforcement cases in RCRA and other federal environmental statutes). 
137 See, e.g., Harmon Industries, Inc. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894, 899 (8th Cir.1999). 
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federal hazardous waste program in all respects, including enforcement.138 
The defendant in that case challenged EPA’s claims by arguing that EPA was 
barred from suing because the state had begun its own action against the 
defendant.139 The defendant had already reached a settlement agreement, 
later approved by a state court, under which the defendant would clean up the 
relevant disposal area and pay no fine.140 While it was implementing the 
cleanup, EPA initiated an enforcement action against it under the RCRA, 
seeking over $2 million in penalties.141 After litigating EPA’s claim through 
an administrative law judge and federal district court, the Eighth Circuit 
affirmed the district court's decision, holding that EPA was barred from 
initiating an independent action against an alleged violator of RCRA that had 
been the subject of a state enforcement action.142 
Enforcers, particularly at the state and local level, also grapple with 
preemption arguments when pursuing environmental enforcement actions.143 
In recent years, preemption has been particularly difficult for state and local 
government enforcers when attempting to enforce environmental regulations 
on natural gas pipelines.144 In one federal district court case, a natural gas 
company sought declaratory judgment and an injunction against a town’s 
enforcement of its zoning ordinance through denial of a building permit.145  
The company argued that without a permit, the town could issue a stop work 
order with potential penalties and jail time for violating the zoning 
ordinance.146 The court agreed, finding that the town’s zoning regulations 
conflicted with the determination approved by the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC).147 In another similar federal district court case, a 
natural gas company sought a declaratory judgment and an injunction against 
                                                 
138 Harmon Industries, Inc. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894, 899 (8th Cir.1999). 
139 Id. 
140 The facts of Harmon Industries, Inc. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894, 899 (8th Cir.1999) 
involved maintenance workers discarding solvent residue outside one of the plaintiff's plants 
for many years.   
141 Id.  
142 Id.  
143 In general, the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power 
to preempt state law and an agency’s preemption regulations, have the same preemptive 
effect as statutes. See Choate v. Champion Home Builders, Co., 222 F.3d 788, 791–92 (10th 
Cir. 2000). Federal preemption occurs where Congress defines explicitly the extent to which 
its enactment preempts state laws, when state law “regulates conduct in a field that Congress 
intended the Federal Government to occupy exclusively, and when it is impossible for a 
private party to comply with both state and federal requirements.  See also English v. General 
Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990). 
144 See, e.g., Empire Pipeline v. Town of Pendleton, 472 F. Supp. 3d 25 (W.D.N.Y. 
2020); Islander Pipeline Co. LLC v. Blumenthal, 478 F. Supp. 2d 289 (D. Conn. 2007). 
145 Empire Pipeline v. Town of Pendleton, 472 F. Supp. 3d 25 (W.D.N.Y. 2020). 
146 Id.  
147 Id.  
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the state of Connecticut to obtain relief from the requirement that it obtain a 
state permit under the state’s Structures, Dredging and Fill Act for 
construction activities related to an interstate natural gas pipeline.148 The 
court held that allowing the state of Connecticut to enforce a sediment-
sampling requirement for construction activities, and then potentially deny 
the company’s permit application, would pose a significant obstacle to the 
pipeline project, thereby colliding with the Natural Gas Act.149 Other federal 
court cases are contending with the ability of a state government to enforce 
state water permits given the Natural Gas Act’s carve out for the rights of 
states to administer CWA water certification programs for discharges into 
navigable waters.150   
 In addition to natural gas pipelines, railway expansion is another area 
with significant pollution consequences that is prone to preemption of local 
government environmental enforcement.151 For example, in Grafton & Upton 
RR Co. v. Town of Milford, a local government dealt with a challenge to its 
efforts to enforce zoning restrictions on preemption grounds. 152 In that case, 
the local government informed a railroad company that it intended to file a 
petition with the Surface Transportation Board (STB) seeking a declaratory 
order that the railroad company’s proposed development of an old rail yard 
was prohibited by the town’s zoning law.153 The railroad company filed an 
action in federal court to enjoin the local government from taking any action 
to enforce its zoning law, arguing that federal interstate commerce law 
preempted any state or municipal statute, ordinance, or regulation supporting 
a delay or prohibition on the railroad’s proposed development.154 The town 
tried to argue that the proposed development was not for transportation 
purposes, but rather only for related train functions more akin to those of a 
trucking company, thereby eliminating any conflict between the federal law 
and the state zoning law.155 However, the court found that the relevant federal 
statute, the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act, indicates an 
express intent on the part of Congress to preempt the entire field of railroad 
                                                 
148 Islander Pipeline Co. LLC v. Blumenthal, 478 F. Supp. 2d 289 (D. Conn. 2007). 
149 Id. at 294. 
150 See generally Millennium Pipeline Co. LLC, v. Seggos, 288 F. Supp. 3d 530 
(N.D.N.Y. 2017). 
151 See, e.g., Ass’n of American Railroads v. South Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 622 
F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 2010) (local government regulation limiting permissible amount of 
emissions from idling trains, imposing reporting requirements, backed by threat of penalties, 
on railyard operators, preempted by federal Interstate Commerce Commission Termination 
Act). 
152 Grafton & Upton RR Co. v. Town of Milford, 337 F. Supp. 2d 233 (D. Mass. 2014). 
153 Id.  
154 Id.  
155 Id.  
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regulation, including activities related to but not directly involving railroad 
transportation.156 Thus, the court held that the local government’s 
enforcement of its zoning regulations would interfere with the proposed 
interstate rail operations.157  
Preemption hurdles arise in multiple other contexts for local 
government agencies trying to enforce existing pollution laws. In Texas, a 
court found that the state air and water pollution laws preempted a local 
government’s ordinance, even though the local government enacted the 
ordinance because it felt that the state’s enforcement of its pollution laws was 
too lax.158 In a Nebraska case, a state court found a city’s ordinance banning 
landfills within 5 miles of the city’s drinking water supply unenforceable 
against a county government’s solid waste disposal site because a state statute 
preempted the city’s ordinance.159 However, in New Hampshire, the state 
Supreme Court found that state solid waste statutes did not completely 
preempt the field of solid waste management and that a town’s local 
ordinance regarding the location of a landfill was not preempted.160  
Lastly, legal hurdles for enforcement can also arise from some of the 
resource hurdles discussed above. The unavailability of enforcement officials 
to find violations in a timely matter means cases may become stale or face 
statute of limitations defenses by regulated entities. In one CWA enforcement 
case, for example, government plaintiffs alleged over one hundred violations 
at one Texas aluminum plant based on self-reported discharge monitoring 
reports (DMR) from the defendant corporate owner.161 The defendant raised 
a statute of limitations defense, arguing in part that the government plaintiffs 
should have known of the violations because EPA has the right to inspect 
permitted facilities. The court specifically noted that EPA region covering 
Texas and other neighboring states receives over 14,000 such similar DMR’s 
each month, and has limited resources with which to perform inspections of 
permit holders’ facilities. Thus, the court held that even though EPA had the 
right to inspect the aluminum plant at any time under the CWA, a belief that 
EPA should have done so did not “correspond with reality.”162  
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157 Boston & Maine Corp. v. Town of Ayer, 330 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 2003) (finding that 
“in order to be permissible under the ICCTA, state and local regulations applied to the 
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158 See, e.g., BCCA Appeal Group, Inc. v. City of Houston, 496 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2016). 
159 Sarpy County v. City of Springfield, 492 N.W. 2d 566 (Neb. 1992). 
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2004). 
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III. CASE STUDY: VEHICLE TAMPERING 
 
This section uses enforcement of air pollution regulations that 
prohibit tampering with emission control devices on motor vehicles as a case 
study to demonstrate the ways in which legal hurdles in environmental 
enforcement manifest in one particular fact pattern. It highlights tampering in 
particular because of the plethora of enforcement activity happening 
currently, and in particular the issues pending related to preemption, 
exceptions, and resources.    
 
A.  Regulations and Compliance 
 
EPA promulgates emissions standards for specific air pollutants 
emitted by vehicles and engines introduced into United States commerce. To 
ensure that every vehicle and engine introduced into commerce satisfies 
emissions standards, EPA administers a certification program.163 Vehicle 
manufacturers apply for a certificate, and in these applications must describe 
specific elements of design to meet relevant emission standards.164 Design 
features may include, for example, fueling strategies, ignition timing, exhaust 
gas recirculation systems, filters, and catalysts.165 The CAA also explicitly 
prohibits any person from removing any device or element of design installed 
on or in a vehicle or engine prior to its sale or knowingly removing any such 
element of design after a sale.166 Thus, the regulations employ, as this article 
describe in Table 1 above, features of what administrative law scholars would 
call both a design-based standard and a prohibition.    
In order to demonstrate compliance with emission standards, vehicle 
and engine manufacturers must obtain a certificate from EPA for new fleets 
of vehicles coming into the market.167 A certificate demonstrates that the 
respective engine or vehicle conforms to all of the applicable emission 
                                                 
163 Memorandum from Susan Bodine, Ass’t Adm’r for Enforcement and Compliance 
Assurance, EPA Tampering Policy: The EPA Enforcement Policy on Vehicle and Engine 
Tampering and Aftermarket Defeat Devices under the Clean Air Act 3 (Nov. 23, 2020), 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/2020-12/documents/epatamperingpolicy-
enforcementpolicyonvehicleandenginetampering.pdf. 
164 Id.  
165 Letter from Evan Belser, Dep. Dir. Air Enforcement Div. EPA to Jason E. Sloan, 
Exec. Dir. Ass’n of Air Pollution Control Agencies et al., Tampered Diesel Pickup Trucks: 
A Review of Aggregated Evidence from EPA Civil Enforcement Investigations (Nov. 20, 
2020), https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/2021-
01/documents/epaaedletterreportontampereddieselpickups.pdf.  
166 CAA § 203(a)(3)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 7522(a)(3)(A), 40 C.F.R. § 1068.101(b)(1). 
167 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (EPA administers a certificate of conformity (“COCs”) program to 
ensure that every new motor vehicle introduced into United States commerce satisfies 
applicable emission standards). 
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requirements.168 An aftermarket part with a principal effect of bypassing, 
defeating, or rendering inoperative any aspect of these elements might be 
considered an illegal aftermarket defeat device.169 To obtain a certificate, a 
manufacturer must submit an application to EPA for each model year and for 
each test group of new motor vehicles that it wants to be able to sell into 
commerce.170 EPA regulations also require periodic “in-use” testing of 
vehicles, which requires manufacturers to periodically test a specified 
number of vehicles and report the results of those tests to EPA.171 EPA uses 
such testing and reporting to watch for noncompliance.172    
The CAA’s prohibition on removing elements of design is trickier to 
monitor. Each certificate application from a manufacturer must include, 
among other things, a list of all auxiliary emission control device (AECDs) 
installed on the motor vehicles.173 An AECD is an element of design that 
senses a parameter, like temperature or vehicle speed, and then changes part 
of the emission control system.174 The tricky thing is that EPA regulations 
allow AECDs when there is a specific justification for its use. 175 It is only 
when an AECD specifically disables emissions controls under real-world 
driving conditions, even if the vehicle passes formal emissions certificate or 
in-use testing, that the law prohibits AECDs.176 Such prohibited AECDs are 
defeat devices.177 As Richard Epstein wrote in a Forbes article, enforcement 
                                                 
168 Overview of Certification and Compliance, US EPA, https://www.epa.gov/ve-
certification/overview-certification-and-compliance-vehicles-and-engines (last visited Sept. 
17, 2021) (The certificate represents engines and vehicles covered by a specific engine 
family or, in the case of light-duty vehicles, a specific test group for each manufacturer).  
169 Memorandum from Susan Bodine, supra note 163. 
170 See 40 C.F.R. §§ 86.1803-01, 86.1827-01 (A test group is comprised of motor 
vehicles with similar engine design and subject to the same emission standards for pollutants 
regulated under the Act).   
171 EPA Requirements for In-Use Emissions Testing for Clean Diesel Technology, U.S. 
EPA, https://www.epa.gov/verified-diesel-tech/requirements-use-emissions-testing-clean-
diesel-technology (last visited Sept. 17, 2021).   
172 Memorandum from Susan Bodine, supra note 163. 
173 40 C.F.R. § 86.1844-01(d)(11) (each as well as a justification for each AECD, the 
parameters they sense and control, a detailed justification of each AECD that results in a 
reduction in effectiveness of the emission control system, and a rationale for why it is not a 
defeat device). 
174 40 C.F.R. § 86.1803-01. 
175 40 C.F.R. § 86.1803-01 (A “defeat device” is an AECD that “reduces the 
effectiveness of the emission control system under conditions which may reasonably be 
expected to be encountered in normal vehicle operation and use, unless: (1) Such conditions 
are substantially included in the Federal emission test procedure; (2) The need for the AECD 
is justified in terms of protecting the vehicle against damage or accident; (3) The AECD does 
not go beyond the requirements of engine starting; or (4) The AECD applies only for 
emergency vehicle.”). 
176 40 C.F.R. § 86.004-2. 
177 42 U.S.C. § 7522(a)(1); 42 U.S.C. § 7522(a)(3)(A). 
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of unauthorized AECDs and defeat devices is hard because the regulatory 
system primarily looks at how vehicles are made and used, and as a result, 
responsibility involves multiple parties, including the automaker, the owner, 
third party drivers, dealers, and other parties.178   
 
B.  Noncompliance and Enforcement 
 
Noncompliance with the CAA’s defeat device regulations made 
national headlines in 2015 with the Volkswagen diesel emission scandal.179   
That infamous case involved a large original equipment manufacturer (OEM) 
installing defeat devices in the computer program of several classes of new 
vehicles.180 The United States has also brought multiple other enforcement 
cases involving OEMs that installed defeat devices in a vehicle’s computer 
system, including against Fiat-Chrystler, Daimler, and Mercedes-Benz.181 
There has been less public attention, however, towards aftermarket cases 
involving individuals, repair shops, and sellers of defeat devices tampering 
with emissions controls on existing vehicles. This type of tampering includes 
reprograming original engine software to override the diagnostic system so a 
tampered vehicle can run without diagnostic check, installing hardware 
designed to defeat emissions controls, or replacing original exhaust systems 
with hollow straight pipes.182    
There are multiple reasons for tampering with emissions controls in 
the aftermarket context. Emissions control devices affect engine performance 
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181 Daimler AG and Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC Clean Air Act Civil Settlement, US EPA, 
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182 Memorandum from Susan Bodine, supra note 163. 
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by increasing fuel consumption, thereby reducing fuel economy.183 
Tampering also avoids cost and time to maintain emissions controls.184 
Further, tampering allows vehicle owners to customize their cars.185 Despite 
the relative lack of attention it receives, aftermarket noncompliance by 
existing vehicles is also a rampant problem in the United States.186 Thus, 
EPA’s enforcement office made aftermarket defeat devices a formal 
compliance priority initiative during the Trump Administration that 
continues today.187 As one law firm blog notes, even during the pandemic, 
EPA resolved more than twenty aftermarket “defeat device” and tampering 
enforcement cases.188 
Widespread tampering and noncompliance has significant 
implications for achievement of the expected benefit from environmental 
regulations. As stated by EPA, tampering disrupts engine calibration and 
balance, which increases emissions of harmful air pollutants.189 Tampering 
with diesel-powered engines is particularly prevalent and problematic. EPA 
estimated in a 2020 report that prohibited tampering with emissions controls 
accounts for more than 570,000 excess tons of NOx and 5,000 tons of PM, 
significantly contributing to the inability of many states to attain national air 
quality standards.190 The report also found that fifteen percent of all diesel-
fueled pickup trucks – about 550,000 – have been tampered with over the 
past decade, resulting in more than 570,000 tons of excess NOx.
191 In the mid-
Atlantic states, around 8.5% of all diesel vehicles registered in Mid Atlantic 
Regional Air Management Association (MARAMA) states have had their 
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emissions controls “deleted” between 2009-2019. That is the equivalent 
60,000 tons of excess NOx above expected levels.
192 
 
C.  Resource, Regulatory, and Legal Hurdles 
 
The multitude of both distinct and intertwined hurdles, as described 
in this article, present significant obstacles for aftermarket tampering 
enforcers. The federal government has made progress on improving 
enforcement, but it cannot do it all. State enforcement agencies are starting 
to increase activity to regulate aftermarket tampering as well.193 Indeed, many 
states have laws prohibiting tampering with in-use vehicles,194 and some 
states also prohibit dealers from selling tampered in-use vehicles.195 
However, various enforcement hurdles have limited the effectiveness of these 
recent efforts to address vehicle tampering. 
Government bodies seeking to enforce vehicle tampering violations, 
particularly at the state level, face a number of resource hurdles. It is difficult 
for states to prioritize resources towards tampering enforcement when there 
is no “credit” available in EPA approval of SIPs.196 In general, states have 
                                                 
192 Mid-Atlantic Regional Air Management Ass’n, Whitepaper on Tampering and After 
Market Defeat Devices: An Analysis of Mid-Atlantic State Compliance and Enforcement 
Options (2020), https://mde.maryland.gov/programs/Air/MobileSources/Documents/Anti-
Tampering/TamperingWhitePaper.pdf. 
193 See, e.g., Enforcement Alert: Tampering of Emission Control Systems on Diesel and 
Gasoline Vehicles Is Prohibited, N.J. DEP’T OF ENVTL PROTECTION (Nov. 15, 2017), 
https://www.nj.gov/dep/enforcement/advisories/2017-08.pdf.  
194 See, e.g., UTAH ADMIN. CODE r.307-201-4 (“No person shall remove or make 
inoperable the [emissions control] system or device or any part thereof, except for the 
purpose of installing another system or device, or part thereof, which is equally or more 
effective in reducing emissions from the vehicle to the atmosphere.”); N.J. ADMIN. CODE 
§ 7:27-15.7 (prohibition of tampering with emission control apparatus); CAL. CODE REGS. 
tit. 13, § 2711(e) (No person shall alter, physically disable, disconnect, bypass, or tamper 
with an installed ARB verified diesel emission control strategy.”); 326 IND. ADMIN. CODE 
§ 13-2.1-3(a)(2) (“No person shall cause, suffer, allow, or permit the removal, dismantling, 
disconnection, disabling, or disrepair of any emission control system which has been 
installed on a motor vehicle by the manufacturer . . . .”). 
195 See, e.g., N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 7:27-15.7(a)(3–3) (prohibiting the “sale, lease, or offer 
for sale or lease” of tampered vehicles); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3704.16(B)(1) (“No 
personal shall . . . sell, offer for sale, possess for sale, advertise, manufacture, install, or use 
any part or component intended for use with or as part of any motor vehicle when the primary 
effect is to bypass, defeat, or render inoperative, in whole or part, the emission control system 
. . . .”); 326 IND. ADMIN. CODE § 13-2.1-3(a)(1), (3) (“No person shall rent, lease, sell, offer 
for sale, or in any manner transfer ownership of a motor vehicle with knowledge that the 
vehicle has been subject to tampering. . . .  No person shall sell, offer for sale, or advertise 
for sale any add-on part or modified part which inhibits the effectiveness or bypasses an 
emission control system. . . .”). See also Memorandum from Susan Bodine, supra note 163. 
196 Letter from David P. Howekamp, Dir., Air Division, EPA, to Richard Somerville, 
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not received credit for tampering enforcement matters because of concerns 
about whether such enforcement can provide real pollution reductions that 
help the state achieve national air quality standards.197 Instead, EPA grants 
SIP credit for mobile emissions reductions on a case-by-case basis.198 While 
EPA grants SIP credits to states for adopting specified inspection and 
maintenance program features (like taking a car in for regular emissions 
testing), EPA does not require states to incorporate anti-tampering laws into 
their SIPs.199 Thus, the lack of credit in the SIP process for state tampering 
efforts impedes state enforcement activity.200 Moreover, given federal 
enforcement measures to address such tampering, some states view state-
specific tampering enforcement as unnecessary and redundant.201 
Additionally, state enforcers have been confronted with a number of 
legal hurdles when addressing vehicle tampering. While the CAA prohibits 
states and localities from “adopting or attempting to enforce any standard 
relating to the control of emissions from new motor vehicles,” it also reserves 
to states and localities the right to control, regulate, or restrict the use, 
operation, or movement of registered or licensed motor vehicles.202 Such 
                                                 
Air Pollution Control Officer, San Diego County, EPA Guidance Letter on Mobile Source 
Emission Reduction Credits 2 (Mar. 14, 2000), 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-07/documents/otaymesa.pdf.   
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198 Letter from David P. Howekamp, supra note 196, at 2. 
199 EPA’s Menu of Control Measures does not include any specific mention of anti-
tampering measures, beyond those incorporated into I/M programs. See EPA, Menu of 
Control Measures (updated Apr. 12, 2012), 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-02/documents/menuofcontrolmeasures.pdf  
200 Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Control of Air Pollution from Motor Vehicle Transportation 
by the Federal and State Governments, 2000A ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 11, at § 11-3 
(2000) (Developing a Motor Vehicle Emissions Control Program As Part of a State 
Implementation Plan) (describing that states that need reduction measures to meet SIP 
revision requirements have a strong incentive to get the reductions).   
201 See Tex. Comm’n on Envtl. Quality, Interoffice Memorandum on SIP Revision to 
Remove Anti-tampering and EAC LIRAP Non-Rule Project No. 2018-006-SIP-NR, (2018), 
https://www.tceq.texas.gov/assets/public/implementation/air/sip/mobile/2018_AntiTamperi
ng_EAC-LIRAP/18006SIP_AntiTamperEACLIRAP_ado.pdf.  
202 CAA § 209, 42 U.S.C. § 7543. See Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. South Coast Air Quality 
Mgmt. Ass’n, 541 U.S. 246 (2004) (explaining that “standard” under § 209 “relate[s] to the 
emission characteristics of a vehicle or engine” and finding state regulations equivalent to 
functionally enforcing a “standard” preempted); Jackson v. Gen. Motors Corp., 770 F. Supp. 
2d 570, 576 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“[Section] 209(a)’s language unambiguously and expressly 
preempts state common law tort actions, provided that they ‘relate to’ the control of 
emissions.”); Allway Taxi, Inc. v. City of New York, 340 F. Supp. 1120, 1124 (S.D.N.Y. 
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language in the statute has required states and local government enforcers to 
thread the needle in deciding which enforcement cases to pursue.203   
Indeed, Volkswagen in January 2021 petitioned the Supreme Court to 
overturn a ruling by the Ninth Circuit that allowed counties to bring 
additional defeat device claims against the company after finding that the 
CAA did not preempt such claims.204 In the aftermath of the Volkswagen 
diesel emission scandal, two local governments, one in Florida and another 
in Utah, brought enforcement cases against Volkswagen, alleging violation 
of state and local anti-tampering laws involving the installation of defeat 
devices.205 While initially the claims focused on VW’s pre-sale installation 
of defeat devices, after a district court decision found Wyoming’s claim 
against VW preempted,206 the local government plaintiffs from Florida and 
Utah amended their complaints to focus on aftermarket software updates.207 
Nonetheless, the Northern District of California dismissed the local 
government Florida and Utah enforcement cases.208 On appeal, the Ninth 
Circuit reversed finding that state and county actions relating to 
Volkswagen’s post-sale actions were neither expressly or impliedly 
preempted under the CAA.209 In Volkswagen’s petition for certiorari, it 
argued that state and local governments’ attempts to enforce their own 
tampering regulations are preempted because those regulations relate back to 
                                                 
April 10, 1972), aff’d, 468 F.2d 624 (2d Cir. 1972) (“The preemption sections, however, do 
not preclude a state or locality from imposing its own exhaust emission control standards 
upon the resale or reregistration of the automobile. Nor do they preclude a locality from 
setting its own standards for the licensing of vehicles for commercial use within that 
locality.”). 
203 See, e.g., In re Office of Attorney General of State of New York, 268 A.D. 2d 1, 11 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2000) (In pursuing the common-law claims, the Attorney General is not, as 
he suggests, attempting to enforce an existing State standard or pursue a simple common-
law claim but, rather, is seeking to use this State's common law to penalize the manufacturers 
for producing engines which failed to comply with the Federal standards promulgated 
pursuant to the CAA. In doing so, the Attorney General is attempting to enforce those 
standards, and we now find that he is expressly preempted from pursuing those claims.”). 
204 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Volkswagen Group of America et al., v. The Envt’l 
Protection Comm’n of Hillsborough County, Florida et al., No. 20-994 (S. Ct. Jan. 2021), 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/20/20-
994/166902/20210121145114485_Volkswagen%20Petition.pdf   
205 See In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Mktg., Sales Practices, & Prods. Liab. Litig., 
264 F. Supp. 3d 1040, 1052–57 (N.D. Cal. 2017).  Note, both the Utah and Florida cases 
were consolidated with actions brought by a number of other states and counties, including 
Wyoming, in the Northern District of California. 
206 See In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Mktg., Sales Practices, & Prods. Liab. Litig. 
264 F. Supp. 3d 1040, 1052–57 (N.D. Cal. 2017). 
207 See In Re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Marketing, Sales Practices, and Prods. Liab. 
Litig., No. 18-15937, at 16–17 (9th Cir. 2020). 
208 See id.  
209 See id.  
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the original design of the engine by the original manufacturer.210 Such a 
drawn-out saga regarding the preemption issue will likely have a chilling 
effect on state and local government enforcement related to defeat device 
cases in the aftermarket context as well.   
Moreover, state and local government enforcement will be important 
to support federal enforcement efforts, particularly because citizen suit 
enforcement authority for defeat device cases is questionable. There have 
been some recent challenges calling into question the use of citizen suits to 
enforce Title II’s anti-tampering provisions. Recently, in Utah Physicians for 
a Healthy Environment v. TAP Worldwide, defendant retailers of aftermarket 
automotive parts challenged whether the CAA’s anti-tampering regulations 
are “emissions standards or limitations” under the Title II citizen suit 
provision.211 By reading “emission standards or limitations” as separate and 
distinct from “prohibited acts,” TAP alleged that Title II citizen suits can only 
concern violations of an “objective measurement of air pollution 
emissions.”212 Thus, TAP argued, any citizen suits concerning anti-tampering 
violations are beyond the scope of Title II’s citizen suit provision.213 Plaintiff, 
however, contended that since the purpose of in-use anti-tampering 
provisions is “to limit the quantity, rate, or concentration of emissions of air 
pollutants,” such provisions function as “emission standards” in 
application.214 Ultimately, a ruling in TAP’s favor would dramatically narrow 
the scope of the citizen suit provision and further restrict efforts to enforce 
anti-tampering provisions. 
Then there are exceptions that impede aftermarket tampering 
enforcement cases. EPA regulations include a “racecar exemption” under 
which vehicles whose engines are modified for solely for competitive use are 
exempted from anti-tampering prohibitions.215 While vehicles modified for 
racing are lawful when used at the track, they are illegal when driven on 
public roads.216 The exemption complicates tampering enforcement, as 
purchasers and sellers of defeat devices for on-road vehicles may circumvent 
                                                 
210 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 204, at 25–26. 
211 See Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgement at 11, Utah Physicians for a 
Healthy Environment v. TAP Worldwide, No. 2:19-cv-00628 (D. Utah Jan. 1, 2020). 
212 See Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgement at 11, Utah Physicians for a 
Healthy Environment v. TAP Worldwide, No. 2:19-cv-00628 (D. Utah Jan. 1, 2020). 
213 Id. 
214 Plaintiff’s Reply to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 11–12, Utah 
Physicians for a Healthy Environment v. TAP Worldwide, No. 2:19-cv-00628 (D. Utah Jan. 
31, 2020) 
215 40 C.F.R. § 1068.235(b). 
216 Id. (“This exemption applies only to the prohibitions in § 1068.101(b)(1) and (2) and 
are valid only as long as the engine/equipment is used solely for competition.”) (emphasis 
added). 
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the tampering prohibition simply by claiming a tampered vehicle was 
modified for use on the track.217 EPA attempted to address this anomaly in 
2015 and sought to amend the racecar exemption to clarify that “nonroad 
engines and vehicles” are defined by the physical characteristics of the 
vehicle—those which make the vehicle suitable for racing—rather than by 
the vehicles use in racing.218 In light of severe pushback from motorsports 
trade associations, EPA abandoned this effort in 2016, but since then has 
continued to assert that vehicles converted for use exclusively for competition 
are still subject to CAA enforcement.219 A district court opinion in a 2021 
EPA enforcement case exemplifies the role of the racing exception in 
enforcement, stating “much ink has been spilled already in this case regarding 
whether a motorsports exception, or exclusion, exists in the C.A.A.”220 
Additionally, while not a formal exception, EPA’s guidance has long stated 
that the agency would exercise enforcement discretion in the context of 
aftermarket part manufacture, sale, and installation where the individual has 
a “reasonable basis” that the conduct will not adversely affect emissions.221 
Such reasonable basis consideration is getting prime attention by regulated 
entities and law firm counsel for future defenses in enforcement cases.222  
 
III. IDENTIFYING “ENFORCEABILITY” 
 
                                                 
217 Roy Furchgott, Crackdown on Emissions Defeat Devices Has Amateur Racers Up in 
Arms, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/13/business/defeat-
devices-clean-air-act.html. 
218 EPA & NHTSA, Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Fuel Efficiency Standards for 
Medium- and Heavy-Duty Engines and Vehicles—Phase 2, 80 Fed. Reg. 40,138, 40,527 
(proposed July 13, 2015).  
219 EPA & NHTSA, Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Fuel Efficiency Standards for 
Medium- and Heavy-Duty Engines and Vehicles—Phase 2, 80 Fed. Reg. 73478, 73,957 
(Oct. 25 2016) (“EPA’s focus is not . . . on vehicles built or used exclusively for racing, but 
on companies that violate the rules by making and selling products that disable pollution 
controls on motor vehicles and public roads. . . . Since our attempt to clarify led to confusion, 
EPA has decided to eliminate the proposed language from the final rule.”).  
220 Furchgott, supra note 217. 
221 See, e.g., Lisa Whitley Coleman, EPA Issues Enforcement Alert on Emissions 
Tampering, EHS DAILY ADVISOR (Mar. 2, 2021), 
https://ehsdailyadvisor.blr.com/2021/03/epa-issues-enforcement-alert-on-emissions-
tampering/ (referring to “reasonable basis” as a defense); Peter A. Tomasi, EPA Issues 
Revised Anti-Tampering Policy, FOLEY LAW FIRM BLOG (Dec. 8, 2020), 
https://www.foley.com/en/insights/publications/2020/12/epa-revised-anti-tampering-
enforcement-policy#:~:text=. EPA has stated that the Tampering Policy is used in exercising 
enforcement discretion in civil actions. 
222 See, e.g., Coleman, supra note 221 (referring to “reasonable basis” as a defense); 
Tomasi, supra note 221. 
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This section suggests that despite the frequent use of the term 
“enforceable” in environmental regulation, the term ultimately lacks 
meaningful substance due to the numerous hurdles that chip away at the 
actual ability to enforce. It provides an overview of where and how the term 
comes up in environmental law. It then argues for a more consistent and clear 
use of the term that reflects the reality for enforcers.    
 
A.  Costs of Continued Failure to Recognize Hurdles 
 
All hurdles to enforcement will not and should not go away. The 
preemption doctrine, rooted in the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution, promotes national uniformity in regulations.223 The preclusion 
doctrine helps avoid jurisdictional strife and duplicative litigation.224  
Political hurdles allow duly elected Administrations to shape their own 
enforcement policy. Even resource hurdles have value in a world in which 
there is a need for government agencies and citizen environmental groups to 
make difficult spending choices across priority areas. Indeed, there are very 
good reasons that legal, regulatory, resource, and political hurdles exist. 
Yet, enforcement cannot meet expectations for real results with 
hurdles in the way. Communities hope and expect that someone will enforce 
pollution permits and standards. There is clear frustration over the lack of 
enforcement in communities, especially environmental justice communities. 
Community groups in Chicago, Illinois, have vehemently objected to the lack 
of city and state government enforcement action to go beyond citations at an 
asphalt plant that has had a questionable history on accounting for all 
pollution sources in permit applications.225 Communities in Camden, New 
Jersey, have dealt with situations where the state cited and fined a plant for 
16 violations of state environmental regulations, but the plant never paid the 
fines, the odors did not cease, and the group discovered that the plant's odor 
control equipment was not sufficient to control the odors produced by its 
operations.226 In listening sessions conducted by Pennsylvania Department of 
Environmental Protection in 2017, one commenter testified that there is really 
no information provided to the public about permit violations.227 In listening 
                                                 
223 JAY B. SYKES & NICOLE VANATKO, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45825, FEDERAL 
PREEMPTION: A LEGAL PRIMER 4 (2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45825.pdf. 
224 Benton, supra note 136, at 200. 
225 Stop MAT Asphalt!, NEIGHBORS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, https://n4ej.org/stop-
mat-asphalt/ (last visited Sept. 17, 2021).    
226 Sheila R. Foster, The Challenge of Environmental Justice, 1 RUTGERS J. L. & URB. 
POL’Y 1, 5–6 (2004) (the citizens with the help of pro bono attorneys, filed a lawsuit 
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227 Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Protection, Office of Environmental Justice Listening Session 
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sessions conducted by the FERC in the spring of 2021, individuals from 
across the nation commented that the FERC certificate processes have 
favored corporate fossil fuel applicants in administrative hearings at the 
expense of actual people, particularly those in rural and low-income 
communities.228  
Moreover, with hurdles in the way, enforcement cannot address the 
issues that researchers and auditors have found with fairness and process 
within environmental enforcement. As recently as July 2021, researchers 
studied administrative data from state implementation of the CWA and 
demographic information around large, regulated facilities and found that 
state regulators’ inspection response time is slower toward noncompliant 
facilities located in communities that have higher percentages of poor and 
Hispanic citizens.229 Other researchers have found disparities in other kinds 
of enforcement actions beyond inspection, including cleanup actions, formal 
notices of violation, informal citations, administrative orders, consent 
decrees, and civil penalties.230 In addition, a state audit in New Orleans found 
that it could take as long as nine years from the time a company was cited for 
violating emission standards before it was ordered to pay a fine or had a 
settlement approved requiring the company to pay for a mitigation project.231 
Such findings in research and audits are likely to continue in a world of 
continued hurdles to actual enforceability of environmental laws and 
regulations.    
Failure to recognize enforcement hurdles could lead to further 
unexpected consequences. Industry defendants might push for opportunities 
to use preclusion arguments by quickly settling with state enforcers, knowing 
that federal enforcers are more likely to require greater penalties and 
remedies for communities.232 Regulation writers might assume that because 
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many environmental laws operate under a cooperative federalism model, 
state and local preemption is not a significant concern in environmental 
law.233 Scholars might think that citizen suit enforcement can gap-fill for low 
agency enforcement resources, when in reality, preclusion and preemption 
hurdles impede citizen suit enforcement too.234 Environmental funders may 
put money towards enforcement efforts that are ultimately ineffective. At a 
minimum, an understanding of the impact of hurdles to enforceability is 
central to any environmental law or regulation’s long-term compliance (and 
noncompliance) outlook.235   
.  
B.  Use of The Term “Enforceable” 
 
Many of the nation’s environmental statutes and regulations 
frequently use the term “enforceable” to refer to pollution and anti-pollution 
standards. The term appears in statutes so varied as to cover environmental 
mitigation, coastal pollution, point source water discharges, air emissions, 
and credit trading programs. In some statutes, as described below, the term 
appears prominently, while in other statutes the term is buried within the 
definition of a definition of another relevant term. It is important, nonetheless, 
to recognize the existence of the term and where and how it is used before 
attempting to understand and define it.    
                                                 
states-for-cwa-enforcement-3382854/ (“The threat of EPA administrative action often 
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cited as an essential legal innovation by virtue of their capacity to provide a backstop to lax 
or ideologically antagonistic administrations.”). 
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NEPA: Under NEPA, agencies must conduct some level of 
environmental review for any federal action that significantly affects the 
environment, including, for example, funding of large polluting infrastructure 
projects like pipelines, roads, and railways. 236 An agency may issue a Finding 
of No Significant Environmental Impact (FONSI) and skip the more detailed 
level of environmental review, so long as the agency commits to performing 
mitigation measures to avoid, rectify, or minimize the adverse environmental 
impact of the project.237 This type of so-called “mitigated FONSI,” however, 
requires that the mitigation measures are enforceable.238 In addition, under 
California’s NEPA equivalent, a public agency is required to mitigate or 
avoid significant environmental effects of a project if it is feasible to do so 
and such mitigation measures adopted by the agency must be fully 
enforceable.239  
The Coastal Zone Act Reauthorization Amendments of 1990 
(CZARA): The CZARA refers to the term “enforceable” in its coastal 
nonpoint pollution control program, which was established under the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), sets 
management measures for states to use in controlling runoff from agriculture, 
forestry, urban areas, marinas, and hydromodification.240 All coastal and 
Great Lakes states and territories that participate in the program are required 
to develop state coastal nonpoint pollution control programs.241 Before 
approving a management program submitted by a coastal state, NOAA must 
find that the management program contains enforceable policies and 
mechanisms to implement the applicable requirements of the state’s 
program.242  
The CWA: The CWA also references the term “enforceable,” 
particularly in its National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) 
permit system.243 Under the CWA's NPDES permit system, the states are 
                                                 
236 Lanessa Chaplin, For I-81 and Environmental Justice Details Matter More Than 
Words, NYCLU (Feb. 26, 2021), https://www.nyclu.org/en/publications/i-81-and-
environmental-justice-details-matter-more-words.   
237 Memorandum from Nancy H. Sutley, Chair of the Council on Envtl. Quality, to 
Heads of Federal Departments and Agencies, Appropriate Use of Mitigation and Monitoring 
and Clarifying the Appropriate Use of Mitigated Findings of No Significant Impact 7 & n.18 
(Jan. 14, 2011), https://ceq.doe.gov/docs/ceq-regulations-and-
guidance/Mitigation_and_Monitoring_Guidance_14Jan2011.pdf. 
238 Id.   
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required to develop water quality standards.244 To meet national water quality 
standards set by EPA, a polluter must comply with effluent limitations, as 
proscribed in a NPDES permit.245 The CWA defines an effluent limitation as 
any restriction established for a pollutant discharged from the source, 
including schedules of compliance.246 Further, the CWA defines “schedule 
of compliance” as “a schedule of remedial measures including an enforceable 
sequence of actions or operations leading to compliance with an effluent 
limitation, other limitation, prohibition, or standard.”247 The CWA also 
requires publicly owned treatment works (POTW) to develop a pretreatment 
program. EPA implementing regulations require that the state agency then 
reissue the POTW’s NPDES permit to incorporate the approved pretreatment 
program as enforceable conditions of the NPDES permit.248  
Underground Injection Control Regulations: The Safe Drinking 
Water Act (SDWA) and Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) 
use the term “enforceable” for their underground injection control program 
in ways that are similar to the CWA.249 Under the relevant regulations, 
underground injection activities, including construction of an injection well, 
are prohibited until the owner or operator is authorized by permit.250 The 
regulations allow for permits to include a “schedule of compliance.”251 In 
addition, like the CWA, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) includes underground storage 
tank regulations that also define a schedule of compliance as remedial 
measures, including an enforceable sequence of interim requirements, such 
as, actions, operations, or milestone events.252 Such remedial measures are 
important for communities, particularly given the kinds of substances 
regulated by underground injection control (UIC) permits, including 
gasoline, diesel, kerosene, and other highly polluting substances.253 
The RCRA: Regulations under the RCRA require owners and 
operators who treat or store hazardous waste at a unit under a permit to 
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248 40 C.F.R. § 403.8(c). 
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https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2018-
06/documents/introduction_to_training_course_and_uic_overview_2018_-
_nathan_wiser.pdf.    
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demonstrate financial assurance for the closure and liability of such unit.254 
An owner or operator may meet the financial assurance requirements by 
obtaining a written guarantee from a specified kind of firm, including a firm 
with a “substantial business relationship” with the owner or operator.255 In 
order to qualify as a “substantial business relationship,” the relationship must 
be the kind of business relationship necessary under relevant state law to 
ensure that a guarantee contract issued in connection with that relationship is 
valid and enforceable.256 The RCRA also requires that owners/operators must 
have permits, or another enforceable document, for the active life and post 
closure period of hazardous waste units.257   
The CAA: Regulations implementing the CAA use the term 
“enforceable” extensively throughout the formulation and implementation of 
the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS).258 Pursuant to the 
CAA, EPA designates areas of the country as either in “attainment,” 
“nonattainment,” or “unclassifiable.” Afterwards it is up to the states to draft 
a SIP for each pollutant (subject to EPA approval) that specifies how the state 
will achieve or maintain attainment status.259 The CAA requires that a SIP 
include enforceable emission limitations and other control measures, means, 
or techniques.260 Additionally, EPA regulations regarding SIPs specify that a 
regulatory limit is not enforceable if it is impractical to determine compliance 
with the published limit.261 Further, EPA can only approve a re-designation 
for attainment status if, among other things, EPA determines that the 
improvement in air quality is due to permanent and enforceable reductions in 
emissions.262 
                                                 
254 40 C.F.R. § 267.143. 
255 40 C.F.R. § 267.143 (g)(1). 
256 40 C.F.R. § 267.141 (h). 
257 40 C.F.R. § 270.1(c). 
258 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408–09 (The EPA, in setting the NAAQS for specific regions of the 
country, specifies the maximum permissible concentration of health based pollutants in the 
ambient air). 
259 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)-(k). 
260 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2).  In addition, The EPA’s guidance for a SIP’s inclusion of 
energy efficiency measures from electricity generation emphasizes that emission reductions 
included in SIP’s must be quantifiable, surplus, and enforceable. See Memorandum from 
Brian McLean, Dir. Office of Atmospheric Programs, & Steve Page, Dir. Office of Air 
Quality Planning and Standards, to Regional Air Div. Directors, Guidance on SIP Credits 
for Emission Reductions from Electric-Sector Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy 
Measures, (Aug. 5, 2004), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-
02/documents/guidance_on_sip_credits.pdf. 
261 State Implementation Plans, 57 Fed. Reg. 13,498, 13568 (proposed Apr. 16, 1992) 
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52) (One of these principles is enforceability which requires 
that SIPs . . . be “enforceable in practice.”). 
262 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d)(3)(E). 
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The CAA also requires that the SIPs for nonattainment areas provide 
for the implementation of all reasonably available control measures as 
expeditiously as practicable.263 Such SIPs must also specifically include 
enforceable emission limitations, and such other control measures, means or 
techniques (including economic incentives such as fees, marketable permits, 
and auctions of emission rights), as may be necessary or appropriate to 
provide for attainment of such standard.264 In a 1997 case, after EPA revised 
the NAAQS for ozone, several states, environmental groups, and trade 
associations challenged EPA's conclusion that states could satisfy the 
applicable reasonable available control technology (RACT) requirement by 
participating in two specific cap-and-trade programs.265 The court found that 
the CAA authorizes EPA to approve market-based measures in addition to 
other enforceable controls.266 The cap and trade program itself was not 
enough to meet the enforceable requirement.267 Similarly, in a 2015 case, 
EPA determined that the Cincinnati–Hamilton metropolitan area had attained 
the NAAQS for particulate matter, in part due to regional cap-and-trade 
programs that reduced the flow of interstate pollution.268 Pointing to the 
language of the CAA, plaintiff Sierra Club argued that Congress did not 
intend for reductions attributable to cap-and-trade programs to meet the 
“enforceable” requirement for re-designation.269 The Court ultimately 
disagreed with Sierra Club, but struggled in its decision, specifically noting 
that the CAA does not define enforceable nor did the Sierra Club offer a 
definition.270   
The term “enforceable” is also increasingly arising in laws and 
regulations involving greenhouse gas emissions. For example, EPA 
regulations under the CAA establish national standards of performance 
(NSPs) limiting greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from certain designated 
power plants.271 Standards of performance for designated facilities included 
under a state’s plan must be demonstrated to be quantifiable, verifiable, 
permanent, and enforceable with respect to each designated power plant.272 
State market-based regulations, such as California’s trading program for 
GHGs, also refer to the term “enforceable” in definitions of offsets. In order 
to qualify as an emission reduction, the offsets must be real, permanent, 
                                                 
263 42 U.S.C. § 7502(c)(1). 
264 42 U.S. § 7502 (c)(6). 
265 NRDC v. EPA, 571 F.3d 1245 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
266 Id.  
267 Id.  
268 Club v. EPA, 793 F.3d 656, 678 (6th Cir. 2015). 
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271 40 C.F.R. § 60.5700a. 
272 40 C.F.R. § 60.5755a(b). 
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quantifiable, verifiable, and enforceable.273 Such language for GHG 
programs is the same as language from emission banking and offset programs 
for other pollutants in many states, such as Arizona’s voluntary emissions 
banking system for NAAQS pollutants.274 
 
C.  Defining “Enforceable” 
 
Widespread use of the term “enforceable” in environmental law 
certainly signals an intent by drafters to focus on actual implementation of 
environmental law. Yet, despite such widespread use of the term, there is no 
unified definition or understanding of the term. To be sure, there are scattered 
definitions in white papers, agency regulations, and guidance documents.275 
Yet, without a clear picture of what the term “enforceable” means in practice, 
it has little substantive effect when drafters use it in environmental law. 
Moreover, it sets up expectations, particularly for local communities most 
affected by environmental noncompliance, that ignore the realities of the 
hurdles that exist in actual enforceability.  
Within regulations implementing the CAA alone, there are multiple 
definitions and interpretations of the term “enforceable.” EPA’s CAA 
regulations for air quality standards on tribal lands provide that “an emission 
limitation or other standard is legally enforceable if the reviewing authority 
has the right to enforce it.”276 The preamble to EPA’s regulation for re-
designation and SIPs, for example, states that: 
 
Measures are enforceable when they are duly 
adopted, and specify clear, unambiguous, and 
measurable requirements.277 A legal means for 
                                                 
273 See, e.g., The California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, CAL. HEALTH & 
SAF. CODE § 38562(d)(1) et seq. (Offsets are credits for emission reductions in uncovered 
sources and sectors to be used by covered entities to meet compliance obligations under the 
cap. Once accepted, offsets are treated as equivalent for compliance pursues, to other 
allowances).   
274 ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R18-2-1205. 
275 For example, the Environmental Law Institute defines an enforceable mechanism as 
a standard applicable to an identified entity or entities, a sanction such as a penalty, or loss 
of a license, and performance of required remedial action, and a process for applying the 
standard and imposing the sanction. ENVTL. LAW INST., ENFORCEABLE STATE MECHANISMS 
FOR THE CONTROL OF NONPOINT SOURCE WATER POLLUTION 1 (Oct. 1997), 
https://www.eli.org/sites/default/files/eli-pubs/d7.06.pdf. 
276 See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 49.167. 
277 Before EPA may redesignate a nonattainment area, the CAA mandates, among other 
things, that it (1) determine that the area has attained the applicable NAAQS (i.e., that ozone 
has decreased sufficiently) and (2) determine that the improvement in air quality is due to 
permanent and enforceable reductions in emissions resulting from the SIP and applicable 
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ensuring that sources are in compliance with 
the control measure must also exist in order for 
a measure to be enforceable.278  
 
The state of Arizona defines enforceable under its voluntary NAAQS 
pollutant banking system as requiring specific measures for assessing 
compliance with an emission limitation, control, or other requirement, in a 
manner that allows compliance to be readily determined by an inspection of 
records and reports.279 EPA also has further CAA guidance that uses the 
phrase “enforceable as a practical matter” or “practically enforceable” to 
further qualify the term enforceable for air permits under the CAA.280 In order 
for air permits to be “enforceable as a practical matter,” they must include 
information on “applicability, compliance date, and specificity of conduct, 
any incorporation by reference, and exemptions and exceptions.”281  
Other environmental laws and regulations such as in agency specific 
NEPA regulations, use the term “feasible” to denote similar concepts as in 
use of the term “enforceable.” For example, to comply with the California 
Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), an environmental impact report's 
mitigation measures must be enforceable and likely to be effective, so as to 
ensure that feasible mitigation measures will actually be implemented as a 
condition of development, and not merely adopted and then neglected or 
disregarded.282 CEQA regulations further define “feasible” as “capable of 
being accomplished in a successful manner within a reasonable period of 
                                                 
federal air pollutant control regulations and other permanent and enforceable reductions. 42 
U.S.C. § 7407(d)(3)(E). After Congress amended the CAA in 1990, EPA articulated its 
interpretation of this provision of the statute in “State Implementation Plans: General 
Preamble for the Implementation of Title I of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990” 
(“General Preamble”). 57 Fed. Reg. 13,498, 13,561–64 (Apr. 16, 1992).  
278 Sierra Club v. EPA, 774 F.3d 383, 393 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing to “State 
Implementation Plans: General Preamble for the Implementation of Title I of the Clean Air 
Act Amendments of 1990” (“General Preamble”). 57 Fed. Reg. 13,498, 13,561–64 (Apr. 16, 
1992)).  
279 ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R18-2-1201. 
280 EPA generally interprets the term “federal enforceability” to require “practical 
enforceability.” See In re Piedmont Green Power, LLC, Pet. No. IV-2015-2, 2016 WL 
7489674, n. 4 (E.P.A. Dec. 13, 2016). 
281 See, e.g., EPA, NEW SOURCE REVIEW WORKSHOP MANUAL, at H.6 (Oct. 1990), 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/2015-07/documents/1990wman.pdf; 40 C.F.R. 
§ 49.152 (Practical enforceability for an emission limitation or for other standards (design 
standards, equipment standards, work practices, operational standards, pollution prevention 
techniques) in a permit for a source is achieved if the permit's provisions specify: (i) A 
limitation or standard. . . (ii) The time period for the limitation or standard. . . (iii) The method 
to determine compliance, including appropriate monitoring, recordkeeping, reporting and 
testing). 
282 CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21081. 
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time, taking into account economic, environmental, legal, social, and 
technological factors.”283 The U.S. Army’s NEPA regulations also look at 
specific factors in deciding whether proposed mitigation measures are 
“practical,” including “military mission, manpower restrictions, cost, 
institutional barriers, technical feasibility, and public acceptance.”284 Further, 
the U.S. Army NEPA regulations state that “practicality does not necessarily 
ensure resolution of conflicts among these items, rather it is the degree of 
conflict that determines practicality.”285 
Without more clarity on these terms like “enforceable,” “feasible,” 
and “practical,” courts will continue to struggle as they already do. For 
example, courts currently diverge when it comes to evaluating the validity of 
FONSIs that rely on agreements by regulated entities to implement certain 
mitigation measures. In Hillsdale, the Tenth Circuit upheld a mitigation 
agreement between the project applicant and the state agency, despite 
plaintiff’s concern over the agreement’s enforceability.286 In that case, the 
federal government, in issuing a FONSI for fugitive dust emissions 
associated with the project, also entered into a binding agreement with the 
state environmental agency to monitor dust emissions at the project site and 
adopt mitigation measures should emissions exceed specified levels.287 If 
dust concentrations exceeded specified levels, the project applicant was 
required to work with KDHE to determine the cause of the elevated dust 
emissions and then take steps to reduce those emissions.288 The plaintiffs in 
Hillsdale argued that there were no studies supporting the effectiveness of 
the mitigation options in the agreement, and that the monitoring period was 
too brief because it did not cover construction of the intermodal facility and 
would expire in two years.289 The court, however, found that even in the 
absence of studies, the federal agency did not commit a clear error in 
judgment by basing its FONSI on the mitigation agreement, presuming that 
the state agency would later uphold its duty to protect air quality and either 
extend the mitigation agreement or continue independent monitoring, as 
                                                 
283 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15364. 
284 U.S. Dep’t of Army regulations, 32 C.F.R. § 651.15(d). 
285 Id.  
286 Hillsdale Envtl. Loss Prevention, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 702 F.3d 
115675 (10th Cir. 2012) (NEPA case involving new intermodal facility in the Kansas City 
area. The existing facility was inadequate to handle the current volume of freight shipped 
through Kansas City and lacked space to expand).   
287 Id.  
288 Id. 
289 Id. (plaintiffs specifically argued that business at the intermodal facility is projected 
to increase for at least twenty years, bringing with it the potential for increased dust 
emissions).  
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necessary.290 By contrast, in other cases like Davis, the Tenth Circuit found 
insufficient a FONSI that relied on a mere list of potential noise abatement 
mitigation measures associated with a large road project without any 
supporting data or any basis for concluding the measures would actually 
occur.291 The plan in that case made no firm commitment to any noise 
mitigation measures, and the environmental analysis leading up to the FONSI 
had actually rejected a number of the proposed mitigation measures as 
incompatible with the project's purpose.292 Moreover, when agencies have 
not pursued a FONSI and instead completed a more detailed environmental 
review, courts have found that proposed mitigation measures “need not be 
legally enforceable, funded or even in final form to comply with NEPA’s 
procedural requirements.”293 A more informed understanding of the term 
“enforceable” would help courts grapple with how to evaluate mitigation 
measures proposed in a NEPA FONSI court challenge.    
Thus, as a starting point, the federal government, particularly the 
OMB, should issue guidance on the term “enforceable” (and related terms 
like feasible). Current OMB guidance on regulatory development simply 
states that agencies should consider the “best enforcement framework” 
including “on-site inspections, periodic reporting, and noncompliance 
penalties.”294 Such guidance on a whole, however, provides little instruction 
for a topic as fundamental as enforcement. An amendment to this current 
OMB guidance to more deeply consider the terms and phrases “enforceable,” 
“enforceable as a practical matter,” “practical,” and “feasible,” is warranted.   
Indeed, the OMB should consider issuing an amended guidance 
document on environmental enforcement and the term “enforceable.” In 
particular, such amended guidance should state that a pollution or anti-
pollution standard is enforceable only if enforcers have the resource, 
regulatory, and legal ability to enforce against violations. 295 Under such a 
                                                 
290 Id. (court specifically cites to other cases where mitigation measures were found to 
be sufficiently supported when based on studies conducted by the agency . . . or when they 
are likely to be adequately policed. For example, another Tenth Circuit case where the court 
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293 Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 222 F.3d 677, 681 n.4 
(9th Cir. 2000). 
294 OMB Circular A-4 (Sept. 17, 2003), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/omb/circulars_a004_a-4/#c. 
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gases for electric generating units, includes a definition of “enforceable” that has some of the 
elements and scope to the suggested definition here in this article. Under such regulation, an 
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definition, the term “enforceable” would include agency consideration of the 
likelihood of funding for the anticipated enforcer.296 Under such a definition, 
the term “enforceable” would include the likelihood of anticipated enforcers 
facing preclusion or preemption claims in an eventual enforcement action.297 
Under such a definition, the term “enforceable” would also include clear 
anticipation of defenses, including those based on exceptions, permit shields, 
and other parts of the underlying regulation itself. In essence, amended OMB 
guidance would require agencies to consider upfront, in drafting regulations 
and guidance, the realities enforcers are likely to face in the future, when 
inevitable non-compliance amongst regulated entities surfaces.   
Further, such amended guidance should clarify that while establishing 
a regime for the potential ability to enforce against violations is important, it 
is not sufficient. Such a focus on a regime for potential enforcement is not 
without merit. Indeed, any enforcement regime must start with authority to 
enforce.298 The dictionary defines “able” as having the power, skill, means, 
or opportunity to do something.299 Thus, it makes sense that providing 
enforcers with the power, skill, means, or opportunity to enforce goes to the 
core of the term enforce-able. The problem of course is that in practice, 
merely establishing a regime for potential enforcement does not translate to 
actual enforcement. Indeed, the dictionary defines “feasible” as possible to 
do easily or conveniently, likely, or probable.300 Thus, amended guidance 
                                                 
emission standard is enforceable if it specifies a limitation and a time period for the 
limitation, compliance requirements are clearly defined, the facility responsible for 
compliance and liable for violations can be identified, each compliance activity or measure 
is enforceable as a practical matter, and the EPA, state, and third parties maintain the ability 
to enforce against violations. See 40 C.F.R. § 60.5755a (f).   
296 See also Memorandum from Richard D. Wilson, Acting Ass’t Adm’r for Air and 
Radiation, to EPA Regional Adm’rs, Guidance on Incorporating Voluntary Mobile Source 
Emission Reduction Programs in State Implementation Plans (Oct. 24, 1997), 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/2016-05/documents/vmep-gud.pdf (“states must be 
able to make a resource commitment to monitor, assess and report on emission reductions 
resulting from any voluntary measures.”). 
297 Ass’n of Irritated Residents v. Kern Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 17 Cal. App. 5th 708, 
752 (2017) (plaintiffs arguing, “federal preemption is a legal factor affecting feasibility.”). 
298 For example, a study of several Asian countries found gaps in authority to enforce, 
particularly with respect to ability to require monitoring of pollution discharges, file criminal 
or civil cases, take emergency response actions (such as closing a facility), impose penalties, 
or order corrective measures. U.N. ENVIRONMENT, ENVIRONMENTAL RULE OF LAW: THE 
FIRST GLOBAL REPORT 67 (Jan. 24, 2019). Without first addressing such gaps in authority 
and ensuring that someone has the ability to hold regulated entities accountable, any 
additional measures to improve enforceability of environmental regulations will likely not 
be effective.  
299 Able, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/able (last visited Sept. 17, 2021). 
300 Feasible, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-
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should grapple with the use of terms like “enforceable” and “feasible” to help 
ensure that future enforcement will not only potentially exist, but also have 
the real ability to actually exist.301 
This is not the first article to push for more rigor in environmental law 
and regulation. Professor Joseph Aldy, for example, has recently pushed for 
EPA to stage a framework for retrospective analysis of a regulation. 
According to Aldy, designing and implementing rules to enable retrospective 
analyses can produce information about the realized environmental 
outcomes, public-health impacts, benefits, costs, labor-market impacts, and 
other factors.302 Other scholars spend ample time debating how cost-benefit 
analysis should be (or not be) redone.303 Still other scholars are arguing for 
new environmental regulations in areas that are not regulated at all or under-
regulated, such as energy efficiency, and coal ash disposal.304 That is not to 
say that scholars are not addressing individual legal and regulatory hurdles to 
enforcement in given contexts. For example, scholars have identified key 
preemption hurdles to implementation and enforcement of energy efficiency 
standards.305 Yet, with the importance of enforcement and enforceability as a 
crosscutting topic across multiple areas of environmental law, it is time to 
examine environmental enforceability across agency drafting writ large, and 




This article argues for consideration of resource, regulatory, and legal 
hurdles in attempts to make pollution and anti-pollution standards actually 
enforceable over the long-term in the United States. However, because 
enforcement agencies abroad face similar hurdles and enforceability concerns 
as in the United States, there is significant opportunity for increased scholarly 
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and practice-based attention to these issues in the international context as 
well.306 In China, scholars have recognized the importance of political 
hurdles, suggesting that that local pollution enforcement officials in particular 
are often beholden to local political officials who tend to favor development 
and industry interests over environmental concerns.307 In India, researchers 
have found that coordination and state/federal jurisdictional hurdles, similar 
to preclusion and preemption hurdles in the United States, are barriers to 
effective environmental enforcement.308 On the case study identified in this 
article, it is clear that the European Union is looking to the United States for 
ideas on enforcement of defeat devices, which are a pervasive non-
compliance problem in multiple European countries.309 Deeper discussion 
over hurdles to environmental enforceability in the international context is 
beyond the scope of this article. However, it is likely an excellent topic for 
established international networks, such as the International Network for 
Compliance and Enforcement (INECE), to undertake.310 
 
 
* * * 
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